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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 1 …the Air Force—I’d never been in an airplane. Never been off the ground. I…
  • p. 3 …Having never been in an airplane and no idea what it was all about, and I…
  • p. 7 …was that the Dyna- soar Program would never fly. The spacecraft was wrong. They were trying…
  • p. 8 …You know, it was a lifting body concept and the landing thing, but it never flew…
  • p. 10 …I wanted you to know that I realize that I should never have threatened you like…
  • p. 14 …As soon as we got selected, we were told that, “No more uniforms.” We were never…
  • p. 19 …T-38s never had much fuel, and you
  • p. 20 …And some—you know, we didn’t have everything available in the spacecraft, so never was…
  • p. 22 …It never existed then. So, there was always disagreement amongst the astronauts about what the relationship…
  • p. 28 …So, there’s always the thought that, well, maybe he was never going to come around…
  • p. 33 …We’d never had a flight longer than 30 hours, or whatever it was, that Gordo…
  • p. 38 …You know, he never got sick flying airplanes and the crazy motions that we did. And…
  • p. 39 …I mean, we would’ve never gotten to the Moon when we did if we’d…
  • p. 40 …He never got involved in the mission, because the one in the Mission Control Center in…
  • p. 43 …Fortunately, we never had to try that! WARD: Do you think the nature of the ejection…
  • p. 45 …And I never did see it again.
  • p. 46 …I never did see it until years and years later, when I started getting all these…
  • p. 49 …So, you never see more than one light, or hardly ever see more than one light…
  • p. 50 …were able to overcome these problems and never get down to where we were on our…
  • p. 54 …and backup crews did except they were never going to fly. So, they helped us test…
  • p. 57 …And some of the North American people maintain to this day that they were never told…
  • p. 59 …And then I never dealt with him again; and finally he got fired. So, I don…
  • p. 64 …We never did find them. You know, we never knew exactly what caused the fire; so…
  • p. 65 …It’s just impossible!” We were never going to get the weight on the lunar module…
  • p. 69 …Throttled the engine up and down through regimes it probably was never throttled at when it…
  • p. 74 …Well, that was never my attitude. That was never my attitude. As a matter of fact…
  • p. 83 …It never occurred except for the fire, but I know I personally expected a lot of…
  • p. 85 …I threw him out of my office and I said, “You are never, ever to come…
  • p. 86 …I ran the Apollo Spacecraft Program I never had a problem with money. We were always…
  • p. 87 …And I’d never played baseball in my life!
  • p. 91 …I thought that we should never interfere in any way with the flight crews on a…
  • p. 94 …And I think that we would’ve never had an Apollo Program if Rocco hadn’t…
  • p. 99 …I never did get my Major’s on my shoulders. He called Ed up, promoted Ed…
  • p. 105 …said who was recommending it but they never said who was opposed to it. So, we…
  • p. 108 …He never second-guessed me. He had a boss. The Associate Administrator for Manned Spaceflight and…
  • p. 109 …And fortunately, my bosses were such that they never second-guessed what I did. They just…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-56
didn’t expect them all to operate perfectly well. There were some fairly sophisticated
cooling systems, where the coolant in the tubes froze up. It was sort of like a selective
freezing process. And as these froze up, then the fluid went through different tubes; and it
would heat up more and then thaw them out. I mean, this was a very, very complicated
thermal control system.
And we had other problems like that. There were internal—environmental control
system was complicated. All the electronics were cooled by cooling plates. They would put
the electronic box under a plate that had fluid going through it, and you had to seal these two
together with something like grease. And so, it was a very complicated thing. And we didn’t
expect it to go flawlessly. Unfortunately, as you well know, it got burned up on the pad.
So—
WARD: Right. At the Apollo 204 fire, as it was known at that time, and the loss of Grissom,
White, and Chaffee.
MCDIVITT: Right. Yeah.
WARD: In those accidents, as it was with the Challenger [51-L] accident years later, the
causes seem so clear in 20/20 hindsight. Things, as you mention, the hatch that was very
difficult to open, that opened inward and made it impossible for the crew to get out when the
fire started. The single-gas oxygen system that provided pure oxygen at a very high pressure
on the launch pad. Those—
MCDIVITT: Yeah. See, we were doing those same things in Gemini and Mercury. We
could’ve had exactly the same problem with Gemini and Mercury. We were pressurizing the

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