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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)
NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer
This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.
“Nevers”36 pages
- p. 1 …the Air Force—I’d
never been in an airplane. Never been off the ground. I…
- p. 3 …Having never been in
an airplane and no idea what it was all about, and I…
- p. 7 …was that the Dyna-
soar Program would never fly. The spacecraft was wrong. They were trying…
- p. 8 …You know, it was a lifting
body concept and the landing thing, but it never flew…
- p. 10 …I wanted you to know that I realize that I should never have threatened you like…
- p. 14 …As soon as we got selected, we were told that, “No more uniforms.” We were never…
- p. 19 …T-38s never had much fuel, and you
- p. 20 …And some—you
know, we didn’t have everything available in the spacecraft, so never was…
- p. 22 …It never existed then. So, there was always disagreement amongst the
astronauts about what the relationship…
- p. 28 …So, there’s
always the thought that, well, maybe he was never going to come around…
- p. 33 …We’d never had a flight longer than 30 hours, or
whatever it was, that Gordo…
- p. 38 …You know, he
never got sick flying airplanes and the crazy motions that we did. And…
- p. 39 …I mean, we would’ve never
gotten to the Moon when we did if we’d…
- p. 40 …He never got
involved in the mission, because the one in the Mission Control Center in…
- p. 43 …Fortunately, we never had to try that!
WARD: Do you think the nature of the ejection…
- p. 45 …And I never did see it again.
- p. 46 …I never did see it until years and years later, when I started getting all
these…
- p. 49 …So, you never see more than one light, or hardly ever see more than one light…
- p. 50 …were able to overcome these problems
and never get down to where we were on our…
- p. 54 …and backup crews did except they were never going to fly. So, they helped us test…
- p. 57 …And some of the North American people maintain to this
day that they were never told…
- p. 59 …And then I never
dealt with him again; and finally he got fired. So, I don…
- p. 64 …We never did find them. You know, we never knew exactly what caused the fire;
so…
- p. 65 …It’s just impossible!” We were never going to get the weight on the lunar module…
- p. 69 …Throttled the engine up
and down through regimes it probably was never throttled at when it…
- p. 74 …Well, that was never my attitude. That was never my attitude. As
a matter of fact…
- p. 83 …It never occurred except for the fire, but I
know I personally expected a lot of…
- p. 85 …I threw him out of my
office and I said, “You are never, ever to come…
- p. 86 …I ran
the Apollo Spacecraft Program I never had a problem with money. We were always…
- p. 87 …And I’d never played baseball in my life!
- p. 91 …I thought that we should never interfere in any way with
the flight crews on a…
- p. 94 …And I think that we would’ve never had an Apollo Program if Rocco hadn’t…
- p. 99 …I never did get my Major’s on my shoulders. He called
Ed up, promoted Ed…
- p. 105 …said who was recommending it but they never said who was
opposed to it. So, we…
- p. 108 …He never second-guessed me. He had a boss. The
Associate Administrator for Manned Spaceflight and…
- p. 109 …And fortunately, my bosses were
such that they never second-guessed what I did. They just…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-55
We didn’t have anything like that in Gemini. It was too small, and we didn’t have the
sensitivity that we did. But it was a very complicated problem.
WARD: But it was just part of the process of bringing a new vehicle on line.
MCDIVITT: Yeah, it was. And then we had—because there was such a rush to get to the
Moon in a certain time that they put together a design on the Block I spacecraft that we
realized early on wasn’t going to make it to the Moon. We were going to have to do certain
things to it that were going to change the configuration. Not the exterior aerodynamic shape,
but things like the hatch. It was extremely difficult to get the hatch on or open. We actually
had to take it off. So, we redesigned the hatch. The contraption that opened up the door on
the telescope didn’t work well. It was prone to failure, and we didn’t want it to fail open.
So, we had to design that. I think we changed that even for the Block I spacecraft.
Some of the instrumentation had to be changed, because you didn’t—you
weren’t going to be making a lunar return reentry at Earth. You were going to be just doing
an Earth orbital reentry, and you could get by with the instrumentation we had. The fuel
tanks were sized a certain way, and then we decided that that wasn’t going to be enough fuel
in them to do the trip to the Moon and the rendezvouses and getting back and all that. So,
there were a significant number of changes that were going to go in between Block I and
Block II.
WARD: And Block I was perceived as the Earth orbital test vehicle.
MCDIVITT: It was really going to be the Earth orbital. What we wanted to do was to get that
thing in flight for a ten-day mission or so to see if it was—how the systems operated. We
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