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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 6 …t a definition of the roles and missions of all the different military services and NASA…
  • p. 29 …control, there was no doubt in my mind what my decision would have been. The Mission…
  • p. 37 …There wasn’t anybody in that Mission Control Center who knew anything about it, so there…
  • p. 40 …Your flight—your Gemini IV mission—was also the first flight where Mission Control was located…
  • p. 61 …But sometimes they just got out of control. WARD: Getting back to the effects of the…
  • p. 68 …We made very few changes to it for the original missions. We made a lot
  • p. 69 …McDivitt 29 June 1999 12-69 of changes to it later on for the longer mission…
  • p. 90 …And nobody was getting this live feed of us possibly losing an Apollo mission. And when…
  • p. 91 …One of which was to allow the reporters in Mission Control with access to the flight…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-55
We didn’t have anything like that in Gemini. It was too small, and we didn’t have the
sensitivity that we did. But it was a very complicated problem.
WARD: But it was just part of the process of bringing a new vehicle on line.
MCDIVITT: Yeah, it was. And then we had—because there was such a rush to get to the
Moon in a certain time that they put together a design on the Block I spacecraft that we
realized early on wasn’t going to make it to the Moon. We were going to have to do certain
things to it that were going to change the configuration. Not the exterior aerodynamic shape,
but things like the hatch. It was extremely difficult to get the hatch on or open. We actually
had to take it off. So, we redesigned the hatch. The contraption that opened up the door on
the telescope didn’t work well. It was prone to failure, and we didn’t want it to fail open.
So, we had to design that. I think we changed that even for the Block I spacecraft.
Some of the instrumentation had to be changed, because you didn’t—you
weren’t going to be making a lunar return reentry at Earth. You were going to be just doing
an Earth orbital reentry, and you could get by with the instrumentation we had. The fuel
tanks were sized a certain way, and then we decided that that wasn’t going to be enough fuel
in them to do the trip to the Moon and the rendezvouses and getting back and all that. So,
there were a significant number of changes that were going to go in between Block I and
Block II.
WARD: And Block I was perceived as the Earth orbital test vehicle.
MCDIVITT: It was really going to be the Earth orbital. What we wanted to do was to get that
thing in flight for a ten-day mission or so to see if it was—how the systems operated. We

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