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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 1 …the Air Force—I’d never been in an airplane. Never been off the ground. I…
  • p. 3 …Having never been in an airplane and no idea what it was all about, and I…
  • p. 7 …was that the Dyna- soar Program would never fly. The spacecraft was wrong. They were trying…
  • p. 8 …You know, it was a lifting body concept and the landing thing, but it never flew…
  • p. 10 …I wanted you to know that I realize that I should never have threatened you like…
  • p. 14 …As soon as we got selected, we were told that, “No more uniforms.” We were never…
  • p. 19 …T-38s never had much fuel, and you
  • p. 20 …And some—you know, we didn’t have everything available in the spacecraft, so never was…
  • p. 22 …It never existed then. So, there was always disagreement amongst the astronauts about what the relationship…
  • p. 28 …So, there’s always the thought that, well, maybe he was never going to come around…
  • p. 33 …We’d never had a flight longer than 30 hours, or whatever it was, that Gordo…
  • p. 38 …You know, he never got sick flying airplanes and the crazy motions that we did. And…
  • p. 39 …I mean, we would’ve never gotten to the Moon when we did if we’d…
  • p. 40 …He never got involved in the mission, because the one in the Mission Control Center in…
  • p. 43 …Fortunately, we never had to try that! WARD: Do you think the nature of the ejection…
  • p. 45 …And I never did see it again.
  • p. 46 …I never did see it until years and years later, when I started getting all these…
  • p. 49 …So, you never see more than one light, or hardly ever see more than one light…
  • p. 50 …were able to overcome these problems and never get down to where we were on our…
  • p. 54 …and backup crews did except they were never going to fly. So, they helped us test…
  • p. 57 …And some of the North American people maintain to this day that they were never told…
  • p. 59 …And then I never dealt with him again; and finally he got fired. So, I don…
  • p. 64 …We never did find them. You know, we never knew exactly what caused the fire; so…
  • p. 65 …It’s just impossible!” We were never going to get the weight on the lunar module…
  • p. 69 …Throttled the engine up and down through regimes it probably was never throttled at when it…
  • p. 74 …Well, that was never my attitude. That was never my attitude. As a matter of fact…
  • p. 83 …It never occurred except for the fire, but I know I personally expected a lot of…
  • p. 85 …I threw him out of my office and I said, “You are never, ever to come…
  • p. 86 …I ran the Apollo Spacecraft Program I never had a problem with money. We were always…
  • p. 87 …And I’d never played baseball in my life!
  • p. 91 …I thought that we should never interfere in any way with the flight crews on a…
  • p. 94 …And I think that we would’ve never had an Apollo Program if Rocco hadn’t…
  • p. 99 …I never did get my Major’s on my shoulders. He called Ed up, promoted Ed…
  • p. 105 …said who was recommending it but they never said who was opposed to it. So, we…
  • p. 108 …He never second-guessed me. He had a boss. The Associate Administrator for Manned Spaceflight and…
  • p. 109 …And fortunately, my bosses were such that they never second-guessed what I did. They just…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-54
because four guys weren’t enough. And so, we had a lead guy and two or three helpers right
towards the end of Gemini IV. So, that’s how the support team came about for specific
flights.
Well, we had something like that on Apollo; but we were getting to the point where
six astronauts and these other guys really weren’t quite enough. And so, we were really
running out of gas as far as having only 24 hours of daytime, six to all this stuff. And but we
went pretty far along. We went all the way through the first one. As soon as I got into the
next one, Apollo 9, with the lunar module, there was no way we could do that with six guys.
So, we then came up with this concept of a support, I don’t remember what we called it, but
we had another crew of astronauts, three astronauts, that sort of did the same things that the
primaries and backup crews did except they were never going to fly. So, they helped us test
there. But we didn’t have that on that first one, and it was just overwhelming.
But I think that the six of us were disappointed that the testing wasn’t going better,
that we were finding so many problems. But I think in—you know, in the real world that that
was what we should have expected. Gus had worked on the first Gemini. I worked on the
second one. So, we both knew how many problems you could get into in a new spacecraft.
We were just getting into a lot of them on Apollo, but it was a much, much more
sophisticated system.
For instance, I remember one day I was going to check the lighting. I was just
turning the lights back and forth. I was doing that, and all of a sudden the technician on the
outside says, “Hey, the rocket engine out here is firing!” I mean, it didn’t have any fuel in it,
but you could hear the solenoids going click-click, click-click, click-click. So, oh my, you
know. We fired the rockets by moving the lights! So, we had what we called
electromagnetic interference, and we had to go back and do that.

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