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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 6 …t a definition of the roles and missions of all the different military services and NASA…
  • p. 29 …control, there was no doubt in my mind what my decision would have been. The Mission…
  • p. 37 …There wasn’t anybody in that Mission Control Center who knew anything about it, so there…
  • p. 40 …Your flight—your Gemini IV mission—was also the first flight where Mission Control was located…
  • p. 61 …But sometimes they just got out of control. WARD: Getting back to the effects of the…
  • p. 68 …We made very few changes to it for the original missions. We made a lot
  • p. 69 …McDivitt 29 June 1999 12-69 of changes to it later on for the longer mission…
  • p. 90 …And nobody was getting this live feed of us possibly losing an Apollo mission. And when…
  • p. 91 …One of which was to allow the reporters in Mission Control with access to the flight…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-40
gotten there. I think when the President said, “we’re going to get there in that decade,” he
provided the best management tool ever known to man. Because you could say, “We’ve got
to stop fooling around and make a decision. Take a big step.” And so, we did.
WARD: Your flight—your Gemini IV mission—was also the first flight where Mission
Control was located, prime, in Houston.
MCDIVITT: Right, right.
WARD: Did that change anything?
MCDIVITT: Not really. We had a backup—the Control Center down at the Cape was in
operation. And I believe Glynn [S.] Lunney was the flight director at the Cape. He never got
involved in the mission, because the one in the Mission Control Center in Houston operated
fine. But we had a backup, and that wasn’t a big deal. And the tracking and things like that
were all independent of what flight Control Center you used. So, they were getting the same
tracking data at the Cape as they were getting in Houston. So, that really didn’t affect
anything.
The thing that—probably the biggest issue we had with respect to—other than the
people flying the spacecraft, was with the doctors. As I mentioned earlier, this thing started
out as a medical experiment; and it still was. That was still a primary function of the
mission, was finding out what kind of shape we were going to be in when we landed. And
about a week or so before the flight, there was a big medical uproar about whether we were
going to die or not when we landed, because we were going to land in the sitting position,
like this [gestures]. Up until that time all the people who landed were in the prone position—

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