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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 6 …t a definition of the roles and missions of all the different military services and NASA…
  • p. 29 …control, there was no doubt in my mind what my decision would have been. The Mission…
  • p. 37 …There wasn’t anybody in that Mission Control Center who knew anything about it, so there…
  • p. 40 …Your flight—your Gemini IV mission—was also the first flight where Mission Control was located…
  • p. 61 …But sometimes they just got out of control. WARD: Getting back to the effects of the…
  • p. 68 …We made very few changes to it for the original missions. We made a lot
  • p. 69 …McDivitt 29 June 1999 12-69 of changes to it later on for the longer mission…
  • p. 90 …And nobody was getting this live feed of us possibly losing an Apollo mission. And when…
  • p. 91 …One of which was to allow the reporters in Mission Control with access to the flight…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-36
the latches.
WARD: Well, if you can’t get the hatch closed, you have a hard time reentering.
MCDIVITT: You’re dead. You’re dead.
WARD: Yeah.
MCDIVITT: Yeah. You’ll either burn up—well, you’ll burn up on the way down for sure.
And the spacecraft would sink as soon as it hit, too, because the hatch would be open. So
anyway, I went down there and fiddled around with him while we were trying to figure out
what was wrong it. And there was a handle and a bunch of little gears about yea big
[gestures] around and teeth on them. And then they had to engage some of the little gears.
And there were some other little gears. And so, it was a fairly complex mechanism. And it
had to be set up so that you could disengage the handle so you wouldn’t inadvertently do
something with it in flight. And those gears weren’t really going together properly. So, he
did something to them and, you know, it worked. But fortunately, I saw what they look like.
And then when we got around to doing the EVA, when we—when Ed went to open
up the hatch, it wouldn’t open. I said, “Oh my God,” you know, “it’s not opening!” And so,
we chatted about that for a minute or two. And I said, “Well, I think I can get it closed if it
won’t close.” But I wasn’t too sure about it. I thought I could. But remember, then I would
be pressurized. I wouldn’t be in my sports clothes, leaning over the top of the thing with a
screwdriver. I’d be there pressurized. In the dark. So anyway, we elected to go ahead and
open it up.
And we didn’t bother telling the ground about that. I mean, there was nothing they

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