Documents / Document

James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 6 …t a definition of the roles and missions of all the different military services and NASA…
  • p. 29 …control, there was no doubt in my mind what my decision would have been. The Mission…
  • p. 37 …There wasn’t anybody in that Mission Control Center who knew anything about it, so there…
  • p. 40 …Your flight—your Gemini IV mission—was also the first flight where Mission Control was located…
  • p. 61 …But sometimes they just got out of control. WARD: Getting back to the effects of the…
  • p. 68 …We made very few changes to it for the original missions. We made a lot
  • p. 69 …McDivitt 29 June 1999 12-69 of changes to it later on for the longer mission…
  • p. 90 …And nobody was getting this live feed of us possibly losing an Apollo mission. And when…
  • p. 91 …One of which was to allow the reporters in Mission Control with access to the flight…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-35
hopeless to try to maneuver around much with just it. But we didn’t have much gas in it and
the tether wasn’t too long, and we couldn’t get in a lot of trouble. But the things that were
important were getting the hatch open, getting the hatch closed, getting out, getting back in,
the equipment that you needed, what the thermal protection was going to be, what the
micrometeorite protection was going to be. Just the fact that we could go out and do that
stuff was very important.
And then probably the hairiest thing that happened to me in space was on that—on
the EVA with our hatch. We’d had a problem with the hatch in the altitude chamber at
McDonnell. We’d done this chamber test and, because we were going to open and close the
hatch in vacuum, well, we thought, we’ll put that into the chamber test. So, right at the end
of the test, we depressurized the spacecraft. You know, the altitude chamber’s just a big
metal box; you can suck all the air out of it. So, we were in this vacuum, and we
depressurized the spacecraft. The suits—we went through all the suit checks and stuff like
that. Then we opened up the hatch.
It was very heavy on the ground, so then we had some additional things that helped us
get it open. Got it open, did some—oh, whatever. I don’t know. Went through some
routine. Then we brought the hatch back down. And we went to lock it, and it wouldn’t
lock. And we were towards the end of the test. We’d been in it, like, probably 10 or 12
hours by then; 14 hours. I don’t know what; it was a long, long time. And we were at—near
the end of the whole test; and we just said, “Oh, we’ll just go through and do the rest of it in
our suits,” pressurized in our suits. So, we did. And so, 30 or 40 minutes, the test was over;
and we went in and they re-pressurized the chamber. We went on in and took a shower and
did our debriefing; and then I went out to see the technician who was working on the hatch
because it was a little concerning that you—when you moved the handle nothing happened to

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 110 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.