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This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt 29 June 1999 12-20 were always, “Should I go to this place? Or should I go to my alternate?” So, I think it was absolutely essential. WARD: Let’s move into Gemini. I’d like to talk with you a little bit about the role that Gemini played in kind of defining the way NASA settled into handling flight operations. One gets the impression that Mercury was kind of “learn it as you go.” The process of determining what role the astronauts were going to have, what role the flight control people were going to have. Getting all that worked out. But you really made it solidify, come together, in Gemini. MCDIVITT: Yeah. Let me jump back a little back to the Mercury. I wasn’t there for Mercury, but in talking to guys who were: there was a big battle over who was really going to be in control of the spacecraft when it was in flight. Was it going to be the guys in the spacecraft, the astronauts? Or was it going to be the guys on the ground? And there were a bunch of—you know, you look back on them, you say these guys have got to be kooky to even have thought things like that. But they—there were ideas that—well, maybe the men couldn’t think when they were up there. I mean, all the control ought to be on the ground. I mean, don’t let them see where they’re going; it might scare them. Or whatever the reasoning. Fortunately, the Mercury guys fought through that in great shape. And by the time we started into Gemini, that battle was over. The concept of men being onboard then, the idea that they ought to be in control was what they had available to them. And some—you know, we didn’t have everything available in the spacecraft, so never was the astronaut totally knowledgeable of what was happening. That was probably exemplified more by Apollo 13 than anything in the world! But no matter how good you were and how good
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