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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 1 …the Air Force—I’d never been in an airplane. Never been off the ground. I…
  • p. 3 …Having never been in an airplane and no idea what it was all about, and I…
  • p. 7 …was that the Dyna- soar Program would never fly. The spacecraft was wrong. They were trying…
  • p. 8 …You know, it was a lifting body concept and the landing thing, but it never flew…
  • p. 10 …I wanted you to know that I realize that I should never have threatened you like…
  • p. 14 …As soon as we got selected, we were told that, “No more uniforms.” We were never…
  • p. 19 …T-38s never had much fuel, and you
  • p. 20 …And some—you know, we didn’t have everything available in the spacecraft, so never was…
  • p. 22 …It never existed then. So, there was always disagreement amongst the astronauts about what the relationship…
  • p. 28 …So, there’s always the thought that, well, maybe he was never going to come around…
  • p. 33 …We’d never had a flight longer than 30 hours, or whatever it was, that Gordo…
  • p. 38 …You know, he never got sick flying airplanes and the crazy motions that we did. And…
  • p. 39 …I mean, we would’ve never gotten to the Moon when we did if we’d…
  • p. 40 …He never got involved in the mission, because the one in the Mission Control Center in…
  • p. 43 …Fortunately, we never had to try that! WARD: Do you think the nature of the ejection…
  • p. 45 …And I never did see it again.
  • p. 46 …I never did see it until years and years later, when I started getting all these…
  • p. 49 …So, you never see more than one light, or hardly ever see more than one light…
  • p. 50 …were able to overcome these problems and never get down to where we were on our…
  • p. 54 …and backup crews did except they were never going to fly. So, they helped us test…
  • p. 57 …And some of the North American people maintain to this day that they were never told…
  • p. 59 …And then I never dealt with him again; and finally he got fired. So, I don…
  • p. 64 …We never did find them. You know, we never knew exactly what caused the fire; so…
  • p. 65 …It’s just impossible!” We were never going to get the weight on the lunar module…
  • p. 69 …Throttled the engine up and down through regimes it probably was never throttled at when it…
  • p. 74 …Well, that was never my attitude. That was never my attitude. As a matter of fact…
  • p. 83 …It never occurred except for the fire, but I know I personally expected a lot of…
  • p. 85 …I threw him out of my office and I said, “You are never, ever to come…
  • p. 86 …I ran the Apollo Spacecraft Program I never had a problem with money. We were always…
  • p. 87 …And I’d never played baseball in my life!
  • p. 91 …I thought that we should never interfere in any way with the flight crews on a…
  • p. 94 …And I think that we would’ve never had an Apollo Program if Rocco hadn’t…
  • p. 99 …I never did get my Major’s on my shoulders. He called Ed up, promoted Ed…
  • p. 105 …said who was recommending it but they never said who was opposed to it. So, we…
  • p. 108 …He never second-guessed me. He had a boss. The Associate Administrator for Manned Spaceflight and…
  • p. 109 …And fortunately, my bosses were such that they never second-guessed what I did. They just…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-18
MCDIVITT: Yeah. Yeah.
WARD: I think if I remember the statistic on that one. It’s 1 in 4 loss rate.
MCDIVITT: Yeah. As a matter of fact, the airplanes they got killed in were all T-38s, which
is a pretty reliable airplane. But that’s what flying’s about!
WARD: Well, I recall after each one of those accidents, there seemed to be a hue and cry
from the press and from members of Congress saying, “These things are just too dangerous.
We can’t afford risking these highly trained, experienced people. And we need—” And then
there would be a study and a look at whether we really needed high-performance aircraft as
part of the training.
MCDIVITT: I’m trying to remember how that went. When I joined NASA, we had some
terrible airplanes. We had a couple of TF-102s, which are side-by-side 102s. The F-102 was
a single-seat interceptor; and a TF-102 was a very—it was a difficult airplane. Well, it
wasn’t difficult to fly. But it was a weird airplane in that they—most training airplanes for
fighters are tandem cockpits. You’re like this [gestures]. For this airplane, they decided to
make them this way [gestures]. And so, the fuselage sort of bulged out there; and the flying
characteristics of the TF-102 were kind of weird. And if you flew it alone, you flew it—you
were obviously in one side of the airplane; you couldn’t see out the other side very well. It
had poor performance compared to the regular F-102; and it wasn’t a very good airplane.
The T-33s were all very old and—but, you know, they served a purpose. They were
reliable and all that, but they didn’t have good performance. And so, it was nice to pick up
the T-38s. As a matter of fact, I went and got the first one. I’d been on a T-38 test flight run

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