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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 6 …t a definition of the roles and missions of all the different military services and NASA…
  • p. 29 …control, there was no doubt in my mind what my decision would have been. The Mission…
  • p. 37 …There wasn’t anybody in that Mission Control Center who knew anything about it, so there…
  • p. 40 …Your flight—your Gemini IV mission—was also the first flight where Mission Control was located…
  • p. 61 …But sometimes they just got out of control. WARD: Getting back to the effects of the…
  • p. 68 …We made very few changes to it for the original missions. We made a lot
  • p. 69 …McDivitt 29 June 1999 12-69 of changes to it later on for the longer mission…
  • p. 90 …And nobody was getting this live feed of us possibly losing an Apollo mission. And when…
  • p. 91 …One of which was to allow the reporters in Mission Control with access to the flight…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-100
WARD: I think all your best answers have come to questions I didn’t ask. I’ll ask you if you
have any more good answers then.
MCDIVITT: Well, let’s see. There was one other thing I wanted to talk to you a little bit
about. What the heck was it now? Well, let’s see. Anyway, I’ll tell you what I thought was
the best thing and the most fun thing and probably the best decisions that we made—
WARD: Yeah.
MCDIVITT: —when I worked for NASA, that were NASA-related decisions. Probably
opening up the hatch on Gemini IV was a damn good decision. Because if we hadn’t done
that, we would have delayed all the EVA stuff and we might not have found out what we
needed to find out early enough to affect us on the later missions. When we were flying
Apollo 9 and Rusty got sick, he was supposed to do the EVA. And it was obvious that he
couldn’t even lie still, let alone do an EVA in the first early days. And so, I had called down
and told them that we were going to scrub the EVA, with Rusty at least. And that I—if I
thought he was well enough to get in a pressure suit and just stay stationary, that I’d do the
EVA. An abbreviated part of it.
And so, we just sort of decided that’s what we’d do. And then the next day, when we
got around to doing it and I was watching him getting dressed and getting ready, he looked
better. And I kept watching him. He looked like he was getting a little bit better. And so,
finally I asked him how he felt. He said, “I—”he didn’t feel perfect, but he felt a lot better
than he had been feeling. And so, I watched him for another while and finally said, “You
think you can do that EVA?” And he said, “Yeah, I think I can.” I said, “Okay. It’s back
on. We’ll do it.” So, I called down and said, “We’re going to do the EVA with Rusty.” And

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