Unidentified Flying Objects Reports

It would not seem necessary for insurgents to use helicopters for crossing into Thailand. Evidence indicates that much of the Thai-Laotian border can be crossed at ground level without a great deal of difficulty, affording a far cheaper, safer and less obvious means of infiltration or exfiltration. Yet Thai military and police agencies continue to report helicopter sightings, or fail to report conflicting information which might derogate claims of helicopter activity. This phenomenon may reflect the fact that the presence of helicopters would be evidence of "externally supported aggression," and provide an explanation of Thailand's insurgent movement which fortuitously permits any possibility of an internal cause. A recent self-analysis by the Thai government Communist-suppression agency in mid-South Thailand provides a notably perceptive insight into a facet of Thai personality which affects additionally the gathering and validity of intelligence information from the field. The report cautions government officials against their prevalent attitude that no report of insurgent activity is sufficiently important to send forward unless it has been bulwarked with references to unidentified support helicopters, transceivers and AK rifles, or the presence of some famous guerilla leader.2

(U) Information coordinated with J-2 USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI.

151D IIR 1 656 0003 69, dated 9 January 1969, file: 56-713/03/5.

2CAS Bangkok FTB 14,475, "Thai Report on Insurgency in the Mid-South, Entitled CSOD's Opinion of the Communist Situation in Mid-South Thailand, dated 11 August 1969".