Unidentified Flying Objects Reports

Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.

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rotor bladea" was probably no more that the poles supporting large ceremonial irums. The location pinpointed by the OV-10 pilot is little more than a mile from a line between Ban Nong Bua and Ban Sang Hin, and such an error would not be unreasonable considering the sighting was made from a moving observation point at night. Further, the possibility exists that RTA personnel, searching for the ground object originally reported, may have come across information pointing to the religious procession, but failed to report it.

Radar and visual sightings of UFOs, such as that being checked out by the OV-10 pilot in this instance, are not a new phenomenon, particularly at night. A January 1969 report lists seven UFO sightings at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB for the period 28 November 1968 to 1 January 1969 alone. Attempts by base reconnaissance aircraft to further identify the objects were unsuccessful. Noting these unresolved reports, the 7/13th Air Force Director of Intelligence offered several comments and possible explanations:

a. On 28 November 1968, the Thai Border Patrol Police (BPP) began an operation involving four to six BPP and Royal Thai Army (RTA) helicopters, in the vicinity of some of the sightings northwest of the base. While Thai pilots had historically been reluctant to fly at night, a recent full moon had made night flying almost as easy as daytime operations, and pilots of both the BPP and RTA had been known to accomplish night flights. Centralized control of these agencies' autonomous counter-insurgency operations is weak, however, and Thai units frequently filed flights plans with the Air Defense Surveillance System only after the fact, if at all.

b. Alternatively, the UFOs sighted might have been aircraft on clandestine flights by US agencies, as such flights are often completed without details being released to traffic control offices. Though it is possible that the illicit flights were friendly, for purposes of privategain, pleasure or smuggling, there was no evidence at the time to substantiate that possibility.

c. During November and early December, radar gear in Thailand, particularly Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) scopes, have historically yielded large numbers of returns from natural or cultural phenomena, e.g., temperature inversions, balloons from fairs and religious celebrations, migratory birds, and kites. In November 1967, Headquarters 7/13th Air Force conducted an experiment at Udorn RTAFB, where GCA scopes were reporting more than fifteen unidentified returns. In a span of ten minutes, human observers physically sighted scores of balloons, three flocks of migratory birds, several kites, plus at least four local helicopters. These sighting, even of friendly flights, could not be correlated with GCA and other electronic returns.

d. In analysing the threat of helicopters penetrating Thailand or supporting insurgent forces, a preliminary study of the technical factors involved determined that landing helicopters in remote jungle clearings at night to airlift personnel or materiel was highly dangerous, particularly without sophisticated navigational and landing aids. Additionally, the nearby Communist or neutral countries from which the helicopters might come do not presently possess adequate numbers of low/slow aircraft to support their own field forces, officials or units by air, without considering any high risk extra-territorial missions.

e. In 1967, unidentified aircraft activity, purportedly in support of Communist insurgents inside Thailand, seemed to preoccupy Thai officials until U.S. resources provided Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. Then, in a speech of acceptance and thanks, General PHRAPHAT, Deputy Prime Minister, said the helicopter threat from outside Thailand had ended or come under control.