Documents / FOIA release

Final Packet Presented To DepSecDef

Defense Intelligence Agency · 18 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Defense Intelligence Agency release is a packet prepared for the Deputy Secretary of Defense before a November 17, 2009 meeting with Senator Harry Reid. It contains a memo from Under Secretary James R. Clapper Jr., talking points, and Reid's June 24, 2009 letter asking for restricted Special Access Program protection for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program, which Reid called AATIP. It also includes DIA reviews of 26 Bigelow Aerospace technical reports. DIA and Clapper found no justification for a Special Access Program.

  • p. 1 INTELLIGENCE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY…
  • p. 4 HARRY REID NE~ADA Honorable William Lynn III Deputy Secretary of Defense 1010 Defense Pentagon Washington…
o Undue attention by government, or private sector entities, not involved in AA TIP
or any international interest will directly or indirectly interfere with the daily
AATIP mission and perhaps threaten the overall success of the program.
• Allocation of personnel, support, and oversight.
o Due to the highly specialized nature of the personnel involved with AATIP, the
overt acknowledgement of their participation in the program will lead to an
unnecessary security and counterintelligence risk.
o Occasional assistance from specialized individuals within DoD, the scientific
community, or academia may be necessary from time to time based on
demonstrated subject matter expertise. Adequate protection of their identities or
affiliation is critical to avoid unnecessary scrutiny.
o Without the appropriate Restricted SAP protection, the cost associated with a
compromise would be significantly higher than the cost associated with a
properly administered Restricted SAP.
o Protection of industry partnerships and participation is critical. Public
awareness of an industry's AATIP affiliation may discourage that industry's
further participation with the U.S. Government in this program.
• Application and engineering.
o The nuanced manner in which some of these technologies will be collected,
engineered and applied by the U.S. may require senior level government approval.
ThCse decision makers must be afforded the necessary time to make strategic
decisions by restricting access to the "big picture" or overall intent of the program
to those on a strict Bigoted List.
o Associated exotic technologies likely involve extremely sophisticated concepts
within the world of quantum mechanics, nuclear science, electromagnetic theory,
gravities, and thermodynamics. Given that all of these have the potential to be
usefl with catastrophic effects by adversaries, an unusually high degree of
operational security and read-on discretion is required.
Due to the expertise required to carry out the objectives of this program, we will require a
small, specialized group ofDoD personnel, who are dedicated to performing the SAP-related
functions and executing programmatic requirements within the program. It is essential that the
Government & military personnel who are already involved with this program are assigned to
further support this program in a Restricted SAP capacity (see Attachment 1). These individuals
all currently possess the appropriate security clearances and are already providing unique support
to AA TIP.

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FOIA release, from the dia collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 18 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.