Final Packet Presented To DepSecDef

HARRY REID
NE~ADA
Honorable William Lynn III
Deputy Secretary of Defense
1010 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1010
Dear Secretary Lynn:
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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7012
June 24, 2009
MAJORITY LEADER
Beginning this past September, the U.S. Senate has mandated that the Defense Intelligence
Agency assess far-term· foreign advanced aerospace threats to the United States. The scope of
program interest covers from the present out to forty years and beyond. In order to further our
effort in recognizing emerging disruptive aerospace technologies, technical studies are being
conducted in regard to advanced lift, propulsion, the use of unconventional materials and
controls, signature reduction, weaponry, human interface and human effects.
Since the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (MITP) and study were
first commissioned, much piogress has been made with the identification of several highly
sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings. Given the current rate of success, the
continued study of these subjects will likely lead to technology advancements that in the
immediate near-tenn will require extraordinary protection. Due to the sensitivities of the
information surrounding aspects of this program, l require your assistance in establishing a
Restricted Special-Access-Program (SAP) with a Bigoted Access List for specific portions of the
MTIP.
In order to support this national effort, a small but highly specialized cadre of Department of
Defense (DoD) and private sector individuals are necessary. These individuals must be
specialized in the areas of advanced sciences, sensors. intelligence/counterintelligence, and
advanced aerospace engineering. Given the likelihood that these tec_hnologies will be applied to
future systems involving space flight, weapons, communications, and propulsion, the standard
management"and safeguarding procedures for classified information are not sufficient. Even the
use of conventional SAP protocols will not adequately ensure that all aspects of the project are
properly secured. Althlugh not every aspect of MTIP requires Restricted SAP read-on, the
following portions should be maintained at the Restricted SAP level:
• The methodology used to identify, acquir~ study, and engineer the advanced
technologies associated with AATIP.
o Specific methodologies used to study unconventional technology may require
nuanced approaches that will un:loubtedly be of significant interest if not a top
priority for adversarial Foreign Intelligence Security Services (FISS).