Documents / FOIA release
This Defense Intelligence Agency release is a packet prepared for the Deputy Secretary of Defense before a November 17, 2009 meeting with Senator Harry Reid. It contains a memo from Under Secretary James R. Clapper Jr., talking points, and Reid's June 24, 2009 letter asking for restricted Special Access Program protection for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program, which Reid called AATIP. It also includes DIA reviews of 26 Bigelow Aerospace technical reports. DIA and Clapper found no justification for a Special Access Program.
UNCLASSIFIED/fl'8t<J8 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100 INFO MEMO U-09-2660~(b)(3):10 USC 424 NOV 132111 FOR: DIRECTOR, SPECIAL PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (b)(3):10 USC 424:(b)(6) FROM: Defense Intelligence Agency SUBJECT: (U) Review of Special Access Program Request (U//f©UO~ This info memo responds to your request for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) j(b)(3):1D usc 424 Ito evaluate a request from Senator Harry Reid (enclosure I) to establish a restricted special access program (SAP) for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program Contract, referred to in Senator Reid's letter as the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AAITP). In reviewing the deliverables to date and looking ahead to planned production in fiscal year (FY) 2010, DIA cannot find adequate justification to establish a restricted SAP. (b)(3):10 USC 424 (U.\lliilWOj ,\II program documents delivered to c__J during FY 2009 (the first year of the program) were unclassified because the contractor had not established a secure facility, and program employees were being vetted for clearances. In FY 2010, most research products will remain at the unclassified level. However, four to six of the original technical reports will be expanded to included classified data. These reports will focus on foreign research in a particular technology area and will likely be derivatively classified at the secret level. Based on classification levels of current and projected program deliverables, there are insufficient grounds to classify this open program, invoke alternative or compensatory control measures (ACCM), or establish a restricted SAP. • (U~lfOUQ) Classifying the overall program by derivative means is impractical given Department of Defense Regulation, DoD 5200.1-R Information Security Program guidance: No reports produced thus far have extracted, paraphrased, or restated information obtained from previously classified material (para C3. l. l ). Future reports that contain classified information will be marked and protected according to the original classification authority (para C3.1.2. l. l ). • (U/'liQI IQ} -Classifying the overall program by original means is inadvisable: Information contained in the reports is not owned by, produced by or for, or under control of the U.S. government (para C2.3. l. l). DIA cannot identify any damage that UNCLASSIFIED/11fl8WQ
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the dia collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 18 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.