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Defense Intelligence Reference Document Space Access Where We ve Been And Where We Could Go

Defense Intelligence Agency · 56 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency and dated 8 March 2010, was produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications (AAWSA) Program. It gives a historical and technical review of how to reach space and return. It covers hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, thermodynamics and materials, and launch options. It argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and propulsion problem rather than a technology one.

  • p. 20 …At the time, the launch vehicle would have been a Martin Titan IIIC. Had an engine…
  • p. 42 …The Model 176 preliminary launches were to be on a Martin Titan IIIC. This was adequate…
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The author was aware of three people-James S. McDonnell, the AFFDL's Albert Draper,
and Russia's Glebe Lozino-Lozinski-who clearly understood the need for a long cross-
range and down-range capability, not just for one missed orbit. Critics will observe that
Lozino-Lozinski had limited his BOR vehicles to an L/D ratio of 1.7 to 1.8 and not the
2.7 to 3.0 required for Earth circumferential glide range. First, the longitudinal extent
of the former Soviet Union was twice that of CON US, and an Earth circumferential glide
range was not necessary to ensure recovery within the continental Soviet Union;
therefore, a lesser L/D ratio was acceptable. Second, in personal conversations with
the author, Lozino-Lozinski indicated a Russian government agency forced him to limit
the glide range to ensure recovery in continental Russia and prevent escape to the
United States. In a further step to prevent escape, when the vehicle was in range of
CONUS, ground control disabled its deorbit system.
The need for a long cross-range and down-range capability so there is no waiting in
orbit in the case of an emergency or military need is presented graphically in Figure 13.
Interestingly, the greatest lateral-range (cross-range) requirement for no waiting is for
55° orbital inclination, the usual Russian orbital inclination. The nominal U.S. orbital
inclination is 28.5 degrees, with a waiting time of 8 orbits (approximately 12 hours) for
a space shuttle-class glider. At the International Space Station orbital inclination, the
orbital waiting time for a shuttle-class glider is 6 orbits. In comparison, Apollo's orbital
waiting time was about 14 orbits, provided the return trajectory included an Earth-
parking orbit before entry into the Earth's atmosphere. The FDL-7 and Model 176 class
of gliders could immediately enter a return glide from their orbits. This provides a
significant advantage for the International Space Station operators and vehicle crew,
who need only enter hypersonic gliders attached to an orbital station and initiate
deorbit procedures to be on the ground in less than 90 minutes in an emergency.
Time (orbits) Required to Land m C aliforma or Fl on da
Orbital Altitude 1s 200 nc1ut1cal miles, 230 1 statute miles, 370 4 km
100 Minimum later 1 Range
ForOnceADa Landrng Maxim 1m W31lrngT,me
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Spc1cecrillt Lateral R,mge (naullcal miles)
Figure 13. Sufficient Cross Range (L/D) Means There is No Waiting to Return
14
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Report, from the dia collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.