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This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 15 December 2010, is a Defense Intelligence Agency report from its Advanced Aerospace Weapons System Applications (AAWSA) Program. It looks at how many unmanned spacecraft one human pilot could control during future deep-space missions, drawing on research into air traffic control and piloting of multiple unmanned vehicles. It concludes that the limits are about 16 craft for simple tasks, 7 for moderately complex tasks and 4 for complex mixed fleets. It adds that physiological measures can signal when an operator is overloaded.
“Mission Control”7 pages
UNCLASSIFIED//F811. 8Ffllil,td, Wlii 8Hlo'f MODELING THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TASK Like any profession, ATC personnel experience day-to-day variation in performance, and there are natural variations between controllers. In order to study these differences, mentioned in most of the studies detailed above, a model needs to be built of the controller, the environment, and the task, with the goal of locating where the majority of changes may be occurring, and where any augmentation may be best suited to assist in performance. Specific to the air traffic controllers, the major variation source found when studying large variations in performance was disruption of the circadian rhythm leading to a disequilibrium condition described as a biological instability. Fortunately, no fancy technology system was required to solve this particular problem, just proper human resource management to avoid frequent shift switching. 35 Loft proposed that modeling the ATC task complexity and workload is insufficient to predict performance due to the overriding effect of operator decision strategy. ATC operators can select priorities, manage their own cognitive resources, and thus regulate their own performance. The primary relief for the ATC operator is handing off traffic to another local operator. 36 Our overall topic is concerned with a single pilot in a space environment, where no room full of colleagues exists to take up the slack; therefore, such group modeling techniques are outside the scope of the current treatise. We do note that Loft develops excellent single-task descriptions of time pressure, conflict detection, conflict resolution, etc. As shown multiple times in the preceding section, single-task processing time and intensity (difficulty or complexity) are the primary drivers of workload. Developing a model connecting time, intensity, and effort, Hendy shows how decision time connects a time-intensity-effort loop (Figure 5). Hendy contends decision time is the single variable dominant in workload. Within this loop model, increasing the event rate is akin to increasing task difficulty. The adaptation strategies are developed with training and experience, a possible explanation of the difference in junior and senior performance with augmentation aids. Averty contends that ATC workload cannot be directly measured, but must be inferred from a quantifiable mixture of including objective and subjective measures. He breaks down the controller task into monitoring, vectoring, and conflict solving, and develops a refinement of the NASA-TLX called TU. Averty's Traffic Load Index is based on number of aircraft, but each aircraft is given additional weight according to processing requirements on the controller, including both cognitive and emotional weight: for example, aircraft with path conflicts to resolve are given the highest weight, while isolated flyover traffic is given low weight. The authors conclude that TU needs to include physiological inputs as well to fully model the task-controller interaction. 15 UNCLASSIFIED/ ,'1'81l 81'1'1@111it 1!1!11!! 8HLV
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Report, from the dia collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 31 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.