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This Black Vault release contains the Air Force's 2001 response from the 341st Space Wing FOIA office at Malmstrom AFB, Montana, to a request about the 16 March 1967 Echo Flight missile shutdown, with excerpts from 341st Strategic Missile Wing histories covering 1967 to early 1968. The histories say all ten Echo Flight launch facilities lost strategic alert almost simultaneously. Investigators could not find a logical cause and found rumors of UFOs near Echo Flight to be unfounded.
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Representatives from the Boeing Company, Autonetics, COAMA, and 15th AF attended. $ ^{43} $ (U)
The group decided that insufficient data on the incident existed to resolve the problem or for adequate engineering analysis without additional testing. The present data suggested that the problem was a Wing I peculiar problem. Since the OOAMA Experimental Test Facility (ETF) was not a Wing I type, it was necessary for the expermints to be conducted at Malmstrom. Further analysis of the problem showed that expermints would be of no real value until a No-Go Mode could be reproduced at least at a LF level.
It was decided by the group to first develop a way to reproduce a No-Go Mode at the LF level then at the Launch Control Facility (LCF) level before a test could be made at Malmstrom. The group was to reconvene at Boeings' Seattle plant on 4 April 67 for development of a way to safely reproduce a No-Go effect. The plan was to be developed at the Network Resolution Area (NRA) at Boeing, with a completion date for the plan set at 5 May 67. 45
During testing at Boeing, a 30 micro sec Pulse (-10 to 0 volt square wave) was placed on the Self Test Command (STC) line at the C-53P Coupler Logic Drawer interface (STC). Seven out of Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 88 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.