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No Objection To DeclassificatidiP0/5':5T NLT-PSF-37-1-1-1 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING 21st and VIRGINIA AVENUE N. W. WAg INGTON OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IChange In Class. p 22 August 1946 -] Deciassiticd C:M. Changed to:TSaSCjfl Na;g. nieview Date: ---- LORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENTS Auth.: HR 70-3 - 25x1 Date: A4Lfl Since preparation of ou$ riginal memorandum dated 1 August 1946 on the subject of "Ghost Rockets" over Scandinavia, additional intelli- gence indicates that the former tentative conclusions should be some- what modified. 1. The weight of evidence now points to Peenemunde rather than to the Gulf of Finland as the probable launching site of most of these "rockets". a. While it was originally believed that the German installa- tions at Peenemunde had been dismantled and shipped to the U.S.S.R., General MoNarney now reports that Peenemuande is operational. b. The U. S. Military Attache Moscow has reported that a key Swedish Air Officer stated th at, on the basis of Swedish radar course- plotting, most of the launchings have been identified with the Peenemunde area. 25X1 d. The Leopoldville radio reported in July that the Soviets were warning shipping against passage through oertain parts of the Baltic and were threatening the death penalty to seamen who might disclose the "phenomena" which they saw. 2. On the basis of the above evidence it seems probable that the U.S.S.R. is carrying out large-scale guided-missile tests around the Baltio, in which most of the missiles are launched from the Peenemunde area and traverse Sweden toward the Gulf of Bothnia. 3. It is the belief of CIG that scientific experimentation is the primary Soviet objective and that political considerations, although thoroughly appreciated, are secondary. a. In view of transportation difficulties it would seem logical for the Soviets to center their experimental program around Peenemunde where manufacturing facilities, materials and German personnel would be close at hand, rather than to set up new installations in Russia. ' SECRUT No Objection To Declassificati3TIO20 E[~ NLT-PSF-37-1-1-1
Report, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 5 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.