Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Cooper”8 pages
# BERLIN CAPABILITY PLANNING: ACTIONS TO MINIMIZE DISLOCATIONS TO THE U. S. ECONOMY AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS I. Introduction This preliminary report is in response to a direction by the President that: "The Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers should submit very preliminary recommendations as to the timing and nature of the preparations to be taken to ensure that execution of the above actions designed to provide a capability for dealing with the Berlin problem in advance of hostilities would cause minimum dislocation of the United States economy and balance of payments. A fuller report will be expected later." Because this submission is limited to the precise focus of the Presidential request, it will not deal with (a) the production controls and related measures needed to facilitate the military supply build-up for the Berlin capability; or (b) preparedness action needed to minimize dislocation of the domestic economy in event of the outbreak of limited or general war, or in event of a crash civil defense program. However, we suggest that the President ask the OCDM, working together with the various departments and agencies concerned, for a report on the preparedness measures outlined in Mobilization Plans C and D, or their current equivalents, in view of the potentialities for limited or full-scale war that are inherent in the present situation. We have assumed that the preparations for firming up the Berlin capability to the levels contemplated would: (1) add between $5 billion and $15 billion to the budget for the fiscal year 1962; (2) require the military call-up of about 500,000 men; (3) necessitate not only increased procurement of military material on existing production lines but the reactivation of additional production lines; (4) require the overseas deployment of between two to twelve additional divisions and supporting air and naval forces, together with the housing and supplies necessary to maintain them from some time in the fall until the end of the fiscal year. We have made no assumption concerning the cost or character of material or supply assistance to our NATO allies in connection with any efforts they may make to expand their forces.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.