Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
## SECRET our determination. On the other hand, if negotiations are to occur and prove fruitful the positions of the two sides should not have hardened irreparably. Thus, Phase I must be a period of flexibility. Military and propaganda measures should not be such as to challenge and provoke the Soviets. They should be principally designed to induce Soviet willingness to compromise. Toward the end of this period the West should be in somewhat better position to negotiate, if that appeared necessary or desirable at that time, although negotiations coming in this phase would likely be principally of public relations significance. In addition, we should be in a position to move rapidly forward with more vigorous measures of military preparedness and with various forms of non-military pressure if the crisis moves into Phase II. Phase II - From September 17 until the "peace treaty" would be signed. The final date is difficult to establish beyond the fact that it would likely be this year. December 1 would be a useful date for planning purposes. We should be prepared to move into this phase by September 17 but we would probably not wish to do so until the Soviet Union actually made an additional move in the direction of a "peace conference". The phase would be characterized by increased pace and scope of overt preparation. The need for retention of flexibility would be somewhat reduced, but it would still be present since negotiations, if they have not yet occurred, are likely to take place in this phase. Toward the end of the phase, if we have reason to believe the Soviet estimate of our seriousness of purpose has altered, it might prove desirable to encourage by indirection the initiation of negotiations. While large-scale economic counter-measures would not be instituted in this phase, overt indications of our intention to take them at a later stage should be given. Meanwhile, economic counter-measures of lesser scale and intensity would gradually be introduced. Phase III - From the signing of the "peace treaty", assumed to be December 1, until the Soviet Union actually turned over control of Berlin access to the GDR. Here again there can be precision in the assignment of dates. However, the period could not be expected to be longer than a month. If the crisis develops as far as this phase, the USSR will have signed a "peace treaty". Our assumptions concerning Soviet intentions will have to be weighted more heavily on the side of their pursuing their policies to the point of a showdown on access to Berlin. Our military preparations will have to be pressed rapidly to completion, including evacuation of dependents,
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.