Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
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## SECRET seizure of Soviet assets in the United States would be permissible under international law as an act of reprisal. As pointed out above, a necessary prerequisite to this reprisal would be an unsuccessful demand by the United States for the Soviet Union to cease its wrongful acts. Although it may be considered advisable to submit the Berlin dispute to the United Nations or to the International Court of Justice prior to the implementation of this countermeasure, this course of action would not appear to be a prerequisite from a legal standpoint since the seizure of Soviet assets in the United States could not by itself be deemed a threat to international peace and security within the meaning of the United Nations Charter. The seizure of the assets of bloc countries other than the Soviet Union could not be easily justified as acts of reprisal under international law since the unlawful acts giving rise to the retaliatory measures would be those of the Soviet Union alone. Although the bloc governments are under the domination of the Soviet Union to varying degrees, it does not follow that each is chargeable with the international consequences of every wrongful act perpetrated by Soviet Union. It is our opinion, therefore, that seizure of assets belonging to those governments or their nationals, in alleged retaliation for the violation by the Soviet Union of its obligations with respect to Berlin access, would not be permissible under international law. ## 7. Terminate trade agreements with Soviet bloc countries. Discussion. The unilateral termination of an international agreement by one of the parties thereto, unless such termination is permitted by and is effected in accordance with the provisions of the agreement, is normally a violation of international law. It is permitted by international law, however, as an act of reprisal in retaliation for an international wrong committed upon the terminating State by the other party to the agreement. Consequently, the United States would be legally justified in terminating agreements with the Soviet Union in retaliation for a violation by the latter of its obligations with respect to the rights of free access of the Western occupying powers to Berlin. As pointed out in the discussion of seisure of Soviet bloc assets as an act of reprisal (countermeasure B-6, supra), the United States would not, however, be justified under international law in illegally terminating trade agreements with members of the Soviet bloc other than the Soviet Union. Apart from the legal aspects of this countermeasure, it should be pointed out that the only Soviet bloc countries with which trade agreements are presently in force for the United States are Poland and Czechoslovakia, and that for the reasons hereafter outlined, it would not seem advisable to terminate any of them. Although the United States, after securing a waiver from the other GATT members, severed all GATT relations with Czechoslovakia in 1951, there is still technically in force a commercial policy agreement with that country effected by an
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.