Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
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## SECRET It would appear from the above-quoted provisions that adequate domestic legal authority exists for the seizure by the Executive of Soviet bloc assets in the United States. However, under Section 9 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, which gives non-enemies a right to sue for the return of their property, a court in the United States might order such return. While this matter has not been heretofore tested, it is possible that in any such action for return, the court would allow a defense by the United States Government based upon the fact that Section 5(b) authorizes the President to deal with vested property "in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States". It could be argued that the "interest" of the United States relates to the desirability of taking reprisal action against the Soviet bloc in a Berlin crisis. The actions by the United States with respect to certain steel mill equipment belonging to the Government of Czechoslovakia are analogous to, but distinguishable from, the proposed countermeasure. In 1954 the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of Section 5(b) and to Executive Order 9193 of July 6, 1942 delegating to him the President's powers under that Section, sold the Czech steel mill equipment located in the United States. The property had previously been blocked in 1952 by order of the Secretary of the Treasury. After the sale, the Treasury held the proceeds thereof in a blocked account until legislation was passed in 1958 authorizing their use to pay certain unsatisfied claims of United States nationals against Czechoslovakia (P.L. 85-604, 22 U.S.C. 1642 at seq.). It should be noted that the actual taking of title by the United States to the Czech property took place under P.L. 85-604 and not under Section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Under international law, the taking by a government of property within its jurisdiction belonging to a foreign government or nationals thereof is illegal unless accompanied by prompt and adequate compensation. Consequently, the contemplated seizure of Soviet bloc assets in the United States without compensation being paid therefor would be a violation of international law unless justified as an act of reprisal. Reprisal is an unlawful act which international law permits as retaliation for an international wrong. It must be preceded by an unsuccessful effort to obtain redress from the offending state and while it need not be the same type of act which occasioned the retaliation, it must be in proportion to the wrong done. It "may be performed against anything and everything that belongs to, or is due to, the delinquent State or its citizens". (II Oppenheim, International Law, 6th Ed., Sec. 37). Since a reprisal is by definition a justifiable act, otherwise illegal under international law, in retaliation for an international wrong, it is not in any way limited by the doctrine of sovereign immunity of property belonging to a foreign government. In the event the rights of free access of the Western occupying powers to Berlin are impaired by some act of the Soviet Union, the
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.