Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
## SECRET 5. Institute total trade embargo against Soviet bloc - Only problems of legality relate to agricultural sales to Poland. 6. Seize Soviet bloc assets in United States - May be possible under existing United States law. From an international standpoint, permissible as a reprisal against Soviet Union but not against other Soviet bloc members. 7. Terminate trade agreements with Soviet bloc countries - No problems of legality with respect to Soviet Union, but United States has no trade agreements with it. Legal and practical problems exist with respect to other bloc countries, particularly Poland. There follows a detailed discussion of each of the above conclusions. A - Countermeasures relating to shipping 1. Bring action to repossess Soviet land-lease ships in Allied ports. Discussion. It is assumed that the repossession which is contemplated is by legal, pacific means rather than by forcible seizure. This question has been examined in the Department of State at various times in the past, and the opinion has been consistently expressed that suits to repossess those ships in the courts of countries where they might be found would fail before the defense of sovereign immunity. It is our view that this defense is not impaired by the obligation of the Soviet Union under Article V of the Land Lease Agreement to return the vessels if the United States so requests after a determination by the President that they are of use to this country. The following conclusion is quoted from a 1954 memorandum by the Legal Adviser: "... it is believed unlikely that successful suits could be maintained for the return of the merchant vessels. It might be possible to hinder the movement of merchant vessels by the institution of such suits, but it would not be for substantial periods, in view of the fact that most jurisdictions have summary procedures which can be invoked which would result in the quick release of the vessel on the application of the defense of sovereign immunity." 2. Refuse to charter shipping to Soviet bloc countries. Discussion. There is adequate authority under Section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act and under Section 101(a) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 to take this action.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.