Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 163 pages · text by OCR

This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.

  • p. 17 …Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS). (5) Increase US war reserve…
  • p. 20 …air and remainder of the division by sea as follows: a. Two battle groups by airlift…
  • p. 21 …from British ports and in the Norwegian Sea. If this movement were carried out during July…
  • p. 23 …Since denial of the right to navigate freely on the high seas would unquestionably be viewed…
  • p. 26 …Soviet and GDR shipping on the high seas for a wide range of reasons such as…
  • p. 29 …For full control of the high seas and international airspace, mobilization measures involving activation of naval…
  • p. 36 …Review readiness status of all STRAC units and supporting units, together with appropriate sea and air…
  • p. 66 …UK would be hampered by commitments under the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea…
can be postponed until serious negotiations seem more imminent than they do now. Indeed, it would be undesirable to freeze our negotiating position this early in the game.

9. Western Attitude Toward East German Personnel Along the Access Routes. The issue here is whether the Western Powers should allow the East Germans to carry out the same procedures regarding access as the Soviets now do, as recommended by Mr. Acheson, or whether the existing contingency plans should be maintained providing for the introduction of a new procedure, when the Soviets leave the check-points, which is less favorable to the East Germans. The arguments pro and con are summarized in Annex J. Further staff work would not seem to be useful; an early decision is required, since the British are pressing for clarification of our position on this point.

10. Other Issues. Three issues are not dealt with in this report:

(a) The Allied Reaction. This can more usefully be considered as part of our attempt to resolve the specific issues indicated above than as a separate subject in itself.

(b) UN. The timing and manner of possible UN involvement in the Berlin crisis will need to be studied further by the Department of State.

(c) Congressional Consultation. This should be considered after decisions have been made on the specific items outlined above.

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.