Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 163 pages · text by GLM-OCR

This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.

  • p. 27 …Soviet-held Liberty ship. (b) With the cooperation of certain foreign governments establish a date for…
  • p. 33 …By the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Director of OCDM, activating the Civil Reserve…
  • p. 125 …September 9 President requests all citizens to cooperate in objectives of the Defense Production Act. September…
  • p. 134 # SECRET # Appendix B The Swiss also are increasingly cooperating, but there are limits to the extent…
  • p. 135 …Should the present situation really develop into a substantial gold outflow, despite the cooperative efforts of…
  • p. 138 …available as a result of coordination and cooperation with our Allies. Actions to be taken under…
  • p. 142 …and Defense and the Director of USIA. Cooperation of the major radio-TV networks should be…
  • p. 143 …In other cases, the facilities and resources of the four may differ, thus making local cooperation…

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can be postponed until serious negotiations seem more imminent than they do now. Indeed, it would be undesirable to freeze our negotiating position this early in the game.

9. Western Attitude Toward East German Personnel Along the Access Routes. The issue here is whether the Western Powers should allow the East Germans to carry out the same procedures regarding access as the Soviets now do, as recommended by Mr. Acheson, or whether the existing contingency plans should be maintained providing for the introduction of a new procedure, when the Soviets leave the check-points, which is less favorable to the East Germans. The arguments pro and con are summarized in Annex J. Further staff work would not seem to be useful; an early decision is required, since the British are pressing for clarification of our position on this point.

10. Other Issues. Three issues are not dealt with in this report:

(a) The Allied Reaction. This can more usefully be considered as part of our attempt to resolve the specific issues indicated above than as a separate subject in itself.

(b) UN. The timing and manner of possible UN involvement in the Berlin crisis will need to be studied further by the Department of State.

(c) Congressional Consultation. This should be considered after decisions have been made on the specific items outlined above.

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.