Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Mission Control”2 pages
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
## SECRET Nature of Allied Harassment, Countermeasures or other Action Countries Taking Action PMSE III (cont'd) US Action Agencies General Comment 5. c. Regulate movement of Soviet bloc vessels in Allied ports. 5.c. US, UK, France 5.c. Treasury 5.c. Under present procedures, US Coast Guard could restrict or exclude any US port to Soviet bloc ships. Harassment potential by regulation of ship movements within US waters and ports is unlimited. It would be contrary to statutory and treaty obligations for UK to regulate shipping movements in a discriminatory fashion. These difficulties would disappear if war seemed imminent. d. Refuse to enter into new contracts to charter shipping to Soviet bloc countries. d. NATO Powers plus Japan, Panama, and Liberia d. Commerce d. US has no legal problems. Can, under existing regulations, prevent US nationals from entering into charter contracts with Soviet bloc countries. UK has no powers to control employment of British ships in peacetime. Something might be done by persuasion, but it would stand little chance of being effective unless similar action were taken by all NATO Powers. e. Refuse ship's servicing to Soviet bloc shipping. e. US, UK, France, Federal Republic e. Commerce Treasury e. Necessary US legal authority extends to offshore servicing by US firms and subsidiaries (see Treasury Appendix B, Item 4). In US view, implications of such a measure would be similar to implications of (b), but action taken would be more drastic and repercussions correspondingly greater.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.