Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Mission Control”2 pages
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
# ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THEIR POSSIBLE PHASES OF APPLICATION ## PHASE III (cont'd) Nature of Allied Harassment, Countermeasures or other Action Countries Taking Action US Action Agencies General Comment 5. a. Initiate harassments concerning documentation, inspections, delay, or technical requirements of Soviet bloc shipping at Allied ports. 5.a. US, UK, France 5.a. Commerce Treasury 5.a. French can implement these under terms of Inter-departmental Instruction of June 1, 1957. US can implement tightening of ships documentation requirements, inspections, etc. by administrative action without recourse to any new or special legislation. UK would be hampered by commitments under the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea, but such measures as were feasible could be introduced almost immediately. However, implementation of this measure would probably lead to retaliation against UK and NATO shipping which would be likely to be of far greater tonnage than Soviet shipping affected. b. Delay ship's servicing (bunkering, lightening, provisioning, naval stores) to Soviet bloc shipping. b. US, UK, France b. State Commerce b. France believes these measures would require consent of private firms, which would tend to oppose measures in peacetime. US has necessary legal authority. In UK view, probably most effective measure under this heading would be action to prevent Soviet bloc ships from obtaining bunker supplies in NATO ports or in other ports in which supplies are controlled by oil companies of NATO Powers. Any action of this kind would have to be arranged with commercial interests and might, therefore, be more difficult than action under (a), which could be carried out by Government officials. It would similarly have repercussions on UK and other NATO shipping.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.