Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Mission Control”2 pages
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
# ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THEIR POSSIBLE PHASES OF APPLICATION ## PHASE III Nature of Allied Harassment, Countermeasures or other Action Countries Taking Action US Action Agencies General Comment 1. Cut off selected types of industrial and technical exchanges in which Soviets are most interested and ban export of published and unpublished technical and scientific information. 1. NATO Powers 1. State Commerce AEC 1. US would experience no legal problem in implementation. UK could at once stop exchanges organized through governmental machinery, and also visits by Soviet bloc technicians to UK. Visits by UK nationals to bloc could only be prohibited by new legislation. A ban could be imposed on export of goods, e.g., magazines, but it is difficult to see how it could be made effective without total embargo on all dealings between UK and Soviet bloc and probably other countries too. 2. Implement countermeasures against USSR and "GDR" in form of tripartite controls over transport on basis equivalent to Soviet harassments. 2. US, UK, France (possibly Federal Republic) 2. State Defense 2. In general, French wish to reserve action on transport measures to Three Powers to retain maximum control of action necessarily diffused over wide geographic area. Would like to retain revocable character of measures. For each measure would like methods of implementation to be provided and adapted to circumstances at time. Distinction should be made in these measures between USSR, "GDR", and other bloc countries in order avoid cementing relations in bloc. Implementation should be preceded by military precautionary measures, i.e. internal Western measures not necessarily observable. Some of measures could be prepared during Phase II for introduction then, particularly the less severe ones.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.