Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 163 pages · text by OCR

This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.

  • p. 27 …Soviet-held Liberty ship. (b) With the cooperation of certain foreign governments establish a date for…
  • p. 33 …By the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Director of OCDM, activating the Civil Reserve…
  • p. 125 …September 9 President requests all citizens to cooperate in objectives of the Defense Production Act. September…
  • p. 134 # SECRET # Appendix B The Swiss also are increasingly cooperating, but there are limits to the extent…
  • p. 135 …Should the present situation really develop into a substantial gold outflow, despite the cooperative efforts of…
  • p. 138 …available as a result of coordination and cooperation with our Allies. Actions to be taken under…
  • p. 142 …and Defense and the Director of USIA. Cooperation of the major radio-TV networks should be…
  • p. 143 …In other cases, the facilities and resources of the four may differ, thus making local cooperation…
# ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THEIR POSSIBLE PHASES OF APPLICATION

## PHASE II (cont'd)

Mature of Allied Harassment, Countermeasures or other Action

Countries

Taking US Action

Action Agencies

4. Undertake discussions at highest levels of government with NATO Powers re possibility of instituting total embargo (exports, imports, financial controls, etc.) against Soviet bloc.

General Comment

4. NATO Powers 4. State

4. In consideration of approach to this problem, dangers of possibility of leaks of information to Soviets re discussions must be thoroughly considered as well as possible desirability of engineering a leak.

5. Interrupt official discussions of new credits for UESR and satellites, or terminate official credits and export credit guarantees, as appropriate, and other similar actions of such a nature as to convince Soviets NATO has every intention introduce economic countermeasures.

5. NATO Powers 5. State

5. Should be time-phased with action taken in intersonal trade field.

US would experience no legal problems; in part these measures already provided for by US law.

French would experience no legal problems.

UK would have no legal problem in stopping new business through Exports Credit Guarantee Department. British Government is not at present extending government-to-government credits to Soviet bloc countries. Existing UK liabilities could not be terminated. Emergency legislative action would have to be taken to control credits by private firms.

6. Arrange for slowdown in issuance 6. NATO Powers 6. Commerce 6. UE would experience no legal problems. of export licenses for shipments to Soviet bloc.

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.