Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Mission Control”2 pages
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
# ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THEIR POSSIBLE PHASES OF APPLICATION ## PHASE II Nature of Allied Harassment, Countermeasures or other Action Countries Taking Action US Action Agencies General Comment 1. Restrict economic negotiations with USSR to most essential matters. 1. NATO Powers 1. State 1. In UK view, chances are there would be no practical problem over financial negotiations, but it would all depend upon what agreements existed or were being negotiated. It might be that negotiations in train concerned debts to West on which we might wish to press Soviet bloc. In the case of trade negotiations, this item refers to a situation short of imposition of a trade embargo and rupture of diplomatic relations in which there is little action open to UK. Some delays could be imposed, but would inflict no serious harm on bloc countries. Trade with East Germany is in different category and action could be taken more easily. 2. Cancel arrangements for Soviet participation in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings scheduled in Western countries (NATO). 2. NATO Powers 2. State Commerce 2. It may prove necessary to denounce US cultural agreement with USSR—and possibly Rumania—in order to implement this step. 3. Cancel arrangements for Western (NATO) participation in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings scheduled in Soviet bloc countries. 3. NATO Powers 3. State Commerce 3. It may prove necessary to denounce US cultural agreement with USSR—and possibly Rumania—in order to implement this step.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.