Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 163 pages · text by GLM-OCR

This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.

  • p. 27 …Soviet-held Liberty ship. (b) With the cooperation of certain foreign governments establish a date for…
  • p. 33 …By the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Director of OCDM, activating the Civil Reserve…
  • p. 125 …September 9 President requests all citizens to cooperate in objectives of the Defense Production Act. September…
  • p. 134 # SECRET # Appendix B The Swiss also are increasingly cooperating, but there are limits to the extent…
  • p. 135 …Should the present situation really develop into a substantial gold outflow, despite the cooperative efforts of…
  • p. 138 …available as a result of coordination and cooperation with our Allies. Actions to be taken under…
  • p. 142 …and Defense and the Director of USIA. Cooperation of the major radio-TV networks should be…
  • p. 143 …In other cases, the facilities and resources of the four may differ, thus making local cooperation…

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## PHASE III

(1 Dec - 1 Jan)

29. Deploy 6 transport squadrons to Europe.

30. Institute pacific blockade or naval blockade, as necessary.

31. Implement 6-division plan in Europe, as necessary.

32. Expand mobilization and take other military actions, as necessary.

NOTES: 1/ Contains representative major actions. Depending on situation and political guidance, numerous supplementary actions or changes would be undertaken. For example, a permanent increase in the US military establishment could be undertaken in lieu of partial mobilization; in addition, involuntary extension of current enlistments could be considered.

2/ It is important to note that mobilization and deployment schedule are dependent on basic decision to declare national emergency. Lead-time of necessary preparatory actions before and after M-day will govern timing of ultimate operations. If basic decision on declaration of national emergency is deferred, corresponding deferrals of most events would result.

2/ Deployment of TAC squadrons could come earlier, in connection with implementation of airlift.

4/ Could be executed at any time after 15 November.

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.