Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 163 pages · text by OCR

This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.

  • p. 92 …the above actions /designed to provide a capability for dealing with the Berlin problem in advance…
  • p. 96 …the above actions designed to provide a capability for dealing with the Berlin problem in advance…
  • p. 98 …The Berlin preparedness measures and public reaction thereto might engender hoarding, scare buying, advance stocking, speculative…
  • p. 99 …the change is due to the conjunction of high levels of economic activity in other advanced…
  • p. 100 …However, it is only prudent to plan in advance to deal with the unfavorable contingencies described…
  • p. 130 …the change is due to the conjunction of high levels of economic activity in other advanced…
  • p. 145 …The Soviets justify their demand for the conclusion of separate peace treaties with the "two German…
## TOP SECRET

d. If it should be determined by the Security Council of the United Nations that the prospective events of the Berlin crisis constitute a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression on the part of the Soviet Union, than a blockade could in theory at least be authorized under the provisions of Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter. As a practical matter, however, such a proposal would undoubtedly be vetoed by the Soviet representative.

e. A blockade might possibly be imposed under Article 31 of the United Nations Charter on the Basis of individual or collective self-defense to repel armed attack but even this action could probably be continued only until the Security Council met to deal with the situation.

f. In sum, the legality of a blockade by the United States, whether belligerent or pacific, is subject to very grave doubts for the reasons outlined above.

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.