Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Cooper”8 pages
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
## TOP SECRET 2. Augmentation of our Berlin aircraft capacity by supplementing military aircraft capacity with civilian aircraft, could be accomplished; a. By the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Director of OCDM, activating the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). This would provide a designated number of passenger and cargo aircraft (approximately 212). This, however, might have a significant impact upon the civilian economy as all over-ocean suitable four-engine cargo aircraft in the U.S. Inventory are contained within this program. The "CRAF capacity" is only available on an all-or-nothing basis--there can be no partial activation. b. By the Secretary of Defense declaring an airlift emergency, and requiring some or all of the current contractors providing airlift service to the Military Air Transport Service to provide the expanded capacity they have committed for emergency purposes. This would provide a lesser number of aircraft than contained in the "CRAF Program." Current contracts cover operations in the Pacific and in the Atlantic. However, in time of an airlift emergency, as declared by the Secretary of Defense, contractors may be ordered to divert to specific areas and specific routes. c. Using civil aircraft in the Berlin operation can raise special legal and operational problems. However, no obstacle exists to the use of civil aircraft to replace military cargo and passenger aircraft in less sensitive areas, thus freeing military aircraft for use in the Berlin operations. This technique would also avoid the legal and operational problems inherent in using civil aircraft in sensitive areas generally. d. The President could not seize or take control of civilian aircraft short of the arising of such a situation as might justify a declaration of war (see joint opinion of Department of State legal advisor and DOD General Counsel, dated 12 January 1960, regarding release of atomic weapons to the United Kingdom). 10 USC, section 9742, provides: "In time of war, the President, through the Secretary of the Air Force, may take possession and assume control of all or part of any system of transportation to transport troops, war material, and equipment, or for other purposes related to the emergency. So far as necessary, he may use the system to the exclusion of other traffic." ## 3. International
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.