Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Cooper”8 pages
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
## TOP SECRET ## LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 1. To augment the present American forces available for deployment in Europe, the following possibilities are legally available: a. The present active duty strength of the armed forces is approximately 2.5 million. Until July 1, 1963, the authorized active duty strength of the armed forces is 5 million. The present active duty strength may be increased under laws now in effect by voluntary appointments and enlistments, by inductions under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, and by involuntary recall to active duty of members of the reserve components of the armed forces. b. Presidential action would be needed to recall members of the reserve components of the armed forces involuntarily to active duty. The reserve components are the Army Reserve, Army National Guard of the United States, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard of the United States, Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The President of the United States is authorized by 10 USC, section 673, upon his declaration of a national emergency, to order not more than one million members of the Ready Reserve to active duty without their consent. He may order these one million members "for not more than 24 consecutive months of duty." c. The Ready Reserve includes both the Army and Air National Guard of the United States as well as the other reserve components. The President would have to declare a national emergency to call them to duty in spite of the fact that we are still operating under the national emergency declared in 1950 preceding the Korean war, for 10 USC, section 673(a), reads in pertinent part, "In time of national emergency declared by the President after January 1, 1953 . . ." The General Counsel's office of the Defense Department has prepared a draft of the Presidential Proclamation to accomplish this purpose. The promulgation of such an order would in effect be a proclamation of a limited national emergency for it would be geared to activate the authority of the President to order the Ready Reserve into active duty. d. Should the situation require action supplementing that set forth above, the President could request the Congress to extend all appointments, enlistments and inductions of personnel already on active duty for an indefinite period. Such action must be taken by Congress. The General Counsel's office has prepared a draft of such a proposed Joint Resolution which would be submitted to the Congress if this action is necessary and desirable. ## 2. Augmentation
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.