Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 163 pages · text by OCR

This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.

  • p. 17 …Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS). (5) Increase US war reserve…
  • p. 20 …air and remainder of the division by sea as follows: a. Two battle groups by airlift…
  • p. 21 …from British ports and in the Norwegian Sea. If this movement were carried out during July…
  • p. 23 …Since denial of the right to navigate freely on the high seas would unquestionably be viewed…
  • p. 26 …Soviet and GDR shipping on the high seas for a wide range of reasons such as…
  • p. 29 …For full control of the high seas and international airspace, mobilization measures involving activation of naval…
  • p. 36 …Review readiness status of all STRAC units and supporting units, together with appropriate sea and air…
  • p. 66 …UK would be hampered by commitments under the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea…
## IMPROVEMENT OF GENERAL WAR POSTURE

1. Although all the military measures previously listed for improvement of non-nuclear posture also contribute to the improvement of general war posture, there are a number of specific measures which could be taken to further enhance US and Allied capability for general war. In this regard it is emphasized that these preparations should be made concurrently with preparations for the use of substantial non-nuclear forces in Central Europe. This is necessary to derive from all preparations a full and effective deterrent effect by convincing the Soviets of US determination and commitment to use whatever degree of force may be required to react successfully to any attempt at interference with access to West Berlin.

2. The specific measures, some of which have been previously listed, which should be taken are as follows:

a. Place SAC in an increased state of readiness which could be maintained over a prolonged period of crisis without degrading its strategic capability.

b. Intensify civil defense measures including the construction of fallout shelters and the placing of substantial contracts for the manufacture of radiation detection meters.

c. Place all US forces world-wide in an increased state of readiness.

d. Discontinue the inactivation and/or retirement of operational forces, such as B-47 wings and amphibious ships.

e. Resume nuclear testing.

f. Resume U-2 flights and reconnaissance flights over Sibaria and the Soviet Arctic.

g. Step up the ICBM program and the program for "hardening" missile sites.

h. Accelerate current action to improve command and control capabilities to include placing the Joint Action Control Staff in a completely operational status.

1. Increase air defense measures.

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.