Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 163 pages · text by OCR

This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.

  • p. 17 …Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS). (5) Increase US war reserve…
  • p. 20 …air and remainder of the division by sea as follows: a. Two battle groups by airlift…
  • p. 21 …from British ports and in the Norwegian Sea. If this movement were carried out during July…
  • p. 23 …Since denial of the right to navigate freely on the high seas would unquestionably be viewed…
  • p. 26 …Soviet and GDR shipping on the high seas for a wide range of reasons such as…
  • p. 29 …For full control of the high seas and international airspace, mobilization measures involving activation of naval…
  • p. 36 …Review readiness status of all STRAC units and supporting units, together with appropriate sea and air…
  • p. 66 …UK would be hampered by commitments under the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea…
## TOP SECRET

(1) Issue orders to appropriate commanders to seize or destroy Soviet and GDR craft including on US territory, airspace or waters.

(2) As a single action in direct rapisal, order appropriate commanders; e.g., Commander-in-Chief Alaska, to seize or destroy a Soviet or GDR military aircraft over international waters within 50 miles of US territory, territorial waters or territorial airspace and outside Bloc territory or airspace.

(3) Increase surveillance of Soviet and GDR fishing fleets and other shipping operating in North Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, seeking rationale for possible further actions at a later stage. Close "buzzing" may be required.

(4) Deny entry of all Soviet and GDR aviation to areas controlled by the United States, Britain, France and West Germany.

(5) Conduct depth bombing exercises from the air or surface ships in areas where Soviet or GDR submarines, which are not openly exercising innocent passage might be maneuvering.

(6) Seek common Allied and other non-Bloc nations to deny entry or delay transit to all Soviet and GDR aviation either by direct prohibition or through administrative requirements.

(7) Harass Soviet and GDR international air traffic through the application of air defense and air traffic control measures.

(8) As a single action in direct reprisal, instruct US unified commanders to flash Joint Chiefs of Staff directly at every opportunity to seize or destroy Soviet and GDR military aircraft or Soviet and GDR surface craft over or in international waters within 50 miles of US territory, territorial waters or airspace and be prepared to execute on Joint Chiefs of Staff command. Similar arrangements might be undertaken by Britain and France and, possibly, West Germany.

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.