Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Cooper”8 pages
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
## TOP SECRET (5) Before such action could be fully affective in the above areas, understandings should be reached with the non-Bloc nations contiguous to the individual areas that they will not hinder our efforts to harass Soviet/GDR shipping. Area (a), Danish Belts and Kiel Canal, for example, would require at least passive approval of the operation by Norway, Sweden, Denmark and West Germany. (6) Attempt to persuade Allied or other non-Bloc nations controlling the waterways referred to in subparagraph (4) to refuse rights of passage to, or to interfere by administrative delays and requirements with the passage of, Soviet and GDR shipping. (7) As a form of legal harassment, consideration might be given to the following courses of action with respect to the aforementioned ships: (a) As a test case, undertake the repossession of a Soviet-held Liberty ship. (b) With the cooperation of certain foreign governments establish a date for the seizure and detention of all out-of-area US-titled Soviet merchant ships (emphasis to be placed on seizing and detaining the maximum number of Liberty's) on grounds that efforts to effect the return of these ships by negotiation have been exhausted. (8) Deny Soviet and GDR shipping access for repairs, refuelling or commerce to ports controlled by US, Britath, France or West Germany, and encourage other nations to harass such shipping by denial of access or by administrative delays and requirements. (9) The question of whether one or all of the above areas and measures would be undertaken should be resolved at the time in the light of the nature of the action against Berlin and the United States and Allied forces available. b. Air Harassments. As in the case of naval harassments, air harassments and reprisals also provide a broad spectrum of possible alternatives such as the following: (1) Issue orders
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.