Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“The Advance”7 pages
## TOP SECRET ## PARTIAL US MOBILIZATION FOR A BERLIN ACCESS OPERATION 1. The US Military Services have, or can create, a capability for: a. A uniflateral girlift to support the Berlin garrison at any time. b. The US portion of a quadripartite airlift to support the civilian population of Berlin, starting at any time and building up to full planned capacity in 90 days. c. Naval harassment actions at any time, and pacific or naval blockade within two months of the time necessary force augmentations are ordered. d. Large-scale nonnuclear ground action, with tactical air support, as necessary, within four months after necessary mobilization is ordered, assuming appropriate use of forces in Europe and assuming reinforcement from the US necessary. e. Keeping SAC in a state of maximum readiness for flexible use over a prolonged period of crisis without degrading its effectiveness. (1/8th of the B-52 force on airborne alert) 2. In deploying forces to create an increased nonnuclear capability to carry out the contemplated actions in Europe, (1) forces now in Europe should remain on their present missions, and (2) forces to cope with world-wide contingencies should be created and maintained to replace forces deployed to Europe. Additionally, because of the serious military situation and increased world tensions which will result from military actions around Berlin, it is advisable to plan for measures to increase our general war readiness, such as those outlined below under "Improvement of General War Posture". 3. The question of whether adequate security for nuclear weapons in Europe now exists and can be maintained without taking steps that would degrade the general war capability of our nuclear forces is still under consideration by the Defense Department. 4. The actions and resulting posture for each military purpose can be summarized as follows, but partial mobilization would be required for the major capabilities requiring substantial personnel increases.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.