Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 163 pages · text by GLM-OCR

This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.

  • p. 27 …Soviet-held Liberty ship. (b) With the cooperation of certain foreign governments establish a date for…
  • p. 33 …By the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Director of OCDM, activating the Civil Reserve…
  • p. 125 …September 9 President requests all citizens to cooperate in objectives of the Defense Production Act. September…
  • p. 134 # SECRET # Appendix B The Swiss also are increasingly cooperating, but there are limits to the extent…
  • p. 135 …Should the present situation really develop into a substantial gold outflow, despite the cooperative efforts of…
  • p. 138 …available as a result of coordination and cooperation with our Allies. Actions to be taken under…
  • p. 142 …and Defense and the Director of USIA. Cooperation of the major radio-TV networks should be…
  • p. 143 …In other cases, the facilities and resources of the four may differ, thus making local cooperation…

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# TOP SECRET

7. Possible naval and air exercises and deployments could include:

a. Deployment of elements of the Second Fleet to war stations, exercising from British ports and in the Norwegian Sea. If this movement were carried out during July or August, and compensating adjustments made in normal movements of other fleet units, no significant additional costs are foreseen.

b. Deployment of a tactical fighter force of five squadrons to Europe, at an estimated post of $2,078,000 for a 21-day exercise.

8. It should be noted that the above described activities are possible actions which might be employed in an effort short of war to deter the Soviets from initiating a Berlin crisis. These actions along would not materially improve the US capability to engage either the GDR or Soviet Bloc forces in a non-nuclear war, but in conjunction with other military and non-military measures world-wide could have some deterrent effect.

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.