Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 163 pages · text by OCR

This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.

  • p. 92 …the above actions /designed to provide a capability for dealing with the Berlin problem in advance…
  • p. 96 …the above actions designed to provide a capability for dealing with the Berlin problem in advance…
  • p. 98 …The Berlin preparedness measures and public reaction thereto might engender hoarding, scare buying, advance stocking, speculative…
  • p. 99 …the change is due to the conjunction of high levels of economic activity in other advanced…
  • p. 100 …However, it is only prudent to plan in advance to deal with the unfavorable contingencies described…
  • p. 130 …the change is due to the conjunction of high levels of economic activity in other advanced…
  • p. 145 …The Soviets justify their demand for the conclusion of separate peace treaties with the "two German…
## TOP SECRET

c. Estimated coat of movement to Europe:

(1) Army. $ 4,000,000

(2) Air Force 30,600,000

TOTAL $34,600,000

5. The STRAC division could deploy two battle groups by air and remainder of the division by sea as follows:

a. Two battle groups by airlift (4216 personnel, 224 aircraft sorties) completing movement to Germany in 4.5 days.

b. Sealifted remainder of division (7339 personnel, three troop transports, three cargo ships) completing movement to Germany in 17 days.

c. Estimated cost:

(1) Army $4,000,000

(2) Navy 428,500

(3) Air Force 12,600,000

TOTAL $17,028,500

6. a. One Reserve or National Guard Division could be called to active duty to replace the deployed division for a period of 30 to 60 days at an estimated cost of:

(1) Thirty days $ 5.142,827

(2) Sixty days $ 9,068,305

b. The divisions involved are currently not at full strength, and the corps headquarters concerned would require a minimum of 30 days prior notice to provide approximately 4,900 USAR fillers to bring one division up to full strength.

c. To call one reserve component division to active duty for this period would require Presidential declaration of an emergency as required by Section 673, Title 10, US Code, though there is the legal possibility that a National Guard division might be called up for this period by a State governor, if he can be persuaded to do so, without such Presidential declaration.

7. Possible

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.