Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 163 pages · text by GLM-OCR

This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.

  • p. 27 …Soviet-held Liberty ship. (b) With the cooperation of certain foreign governments establish a date for…
  • p. 33 …By the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Director of OCDM, activating the Civil Reserve…
  • p. 125 …September 9 President requests all citizens to cooperate in objectives of the Defense Production Act. September…
  • p. 134 # SECRET # Appendix B The Swiss also are increasingly cooperating, but there are limits to the extent…
  • p. 135 …Should the present situation really develop into a substantial gold outflow, despite the cooperative efforts of…
  • p. 138 …available as a result of coordination and cooperation with our Allies. Actions to be taken under…
  • p. 142 …and Defense and the Director of USIA. Cooperation of the major radio-TV networks should be…
  • p. 143 …In other cases, the facilities and resources of the four may differ, thus making local cooperation…

Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.

## TOP SECRET

c. Estimated coat of movement to Europe:

(1) Army. $ 4,000,000

(2) Air Force 30,600,000

TOTAL $34,600,000

5. The STRAC division could deploy two battle groups by air and remainder of the division by sea as follows:

a. Two battle groups by airlift (4216 personnel, 224 aircraft sorties) completing movement to Germany in 4.5 days.

b. Sealifted remainder of division (7339 personnel, three troop transports, three cargo ships) completing movement to Germany in 17 days.

c. Estimated cost:

(1) Army $4,000,000

(2) Navy 428,500

(3) Air Force 12,600,000

TOTAL $17,028,500

6. a. One Reserve or National Guard Division could be called to active duty to replace the deployed division for a period of 30 to 60 days at an estimated cost of:

(1) Thirty days $ 5.142,827

(2) Sixty days $ 9,068,305

b. The divisions involved are currently not at full strength, and the corps headquarters concerned would require a minimum of 30 days prior notice to provide approximately 4,900 USAR fillers to bring one division up to full strength.

c. To call one reserve component division to active duty for this period would require Presidential declaration of an emergency as required by Section 673, Title 10, US Code, though there is the legal possibility that a National Guard division might be called up for this period by a State governor, if he can be persuaded to do so, without such Presidential declaration.

7. Possible

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.