Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 163 pages · text by OCR

This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.

  • p. 92 …the above actions /designed to provide a capability for dealing with the Berlin problem in advance…
  • p. 96 …the above actions designed to provide a capability for dealing with the Berlin problem in advance…
  • p. 98 …The Berlin preparedness measures and public reaction thereto might engender hoarding, scare buying, advance stocking, speculative…
  • p. 99 …the change is due to the conjunction of high levels of economic activity in other advanced…
  • p. 100 …However, it is only prudent to plan in advance to deal with the unfavorable contingencies described…
  • p. 130 …the change is due to the conjunction of high levels of economic activity in other advanced…
  • p. 145 …The Soviets justify their demand for the conclusion of separate peace treaties with the "two German…
## TOP SECRET

# TEMPORARY REINFORCEMENT OF EUROPE

1. The temporary reinforcement of US military forces could be accomplished by:

a. Conducting a two battle group air mobility exercise from the US to Germany.

b. Deploying an entire STRAC division to Germany for a 30 to 60 day period, or for the duration of the crisis, and replacing it in the strategic reserve by calling one National Guard or Reserve division to active duty for a 30 to 60 day period.

c. Conducting other similar ground, naval, and air exercises and deployments directed toward Europe.

2. The STRAC force and airlift aircraft required to accomplish either of the first two activities could in an emergency commence deployment on one hour's notice.

3. The STRAC two battle group force could deploy in an emergency from a condition of full alert and complete its movement to Germany in 4.5 days.

a. Strength: 4216

b. Airlift required: 224 sorties

c. Estimated cost of movement to Europe:

(1) Army $ 650,000

(2) Air Force 12,100,000

TOTAL $ 12,750,000

4. The STRAC division could deploy in an emergency from a condition of full alert and complete its movement to Germany in nine days:

a. Strength: 11,555

b. Airlift required: 560 sorties

c. Estimated cost

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.