Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 163 pages · text by GLM-OCR

This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.

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## TOP SECRET

## MEASURES PRIOR TO DECLARATION OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

1. A national emergency must be declared before that measure can be undertaken which would result in an early, substantial increase in non-nuclear capability, i.e., the partial mobilization of forces and manpower from the reserve components. (See Legal Considerations, action below.) However, a number of military preparations could be made in the absence of a declaration of national emergency. These preparations would both give evidence of our serious purpose and appreciably increase the pace at which substantial increases in capabilities could be achieved following such a declaration. For full effectiveness, these measures must be wholly authentic and carried out in an orderly and progressive manner without fanfare or public alarm.

2. In general, military preparations of the following types could be carried out:

a. Measures requiring little lead time.

(1) Implementation of increased operational readiness measures by US forces worldwide but particularly in Europe, as appropriate.

(2) Increased draft calls.

(3) Intensified training of US and allied forces earmarked for a probe of Soviet and GDR intentions along the Autobahn and those earmarked for the restoration of ground access to Berlin.

(4) Deployment of a US or tripartite reinforced division from present locations in Germany to the Helmstedt area. (i.e., positioned for movement toward Berlin.)

(5) Increased readiness to execute existing demolition and mining plans in Central Europe.

(6) Alert naval and air forces for possible early execution of a variety of world-wide harassment, reprisal, and increased surveillance measures, particularly in Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Baltic.

(7) Conduct air

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.