Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Headquarters”2 pages
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
## SECRET ## ALTERNATIVE POSTURES CONCERNING EAST GERMANS ON ACCESS ROUTES It has been requested that the Secretary of State submit recommendations concerning the posture which the US, UK, and France should adopt toward the appearance of East German personnel along the routes of access to Berlin following a "peace treaty." These recommendations were not requested for the NSC meeting of July 13, but it was suggested that the possible alternatives might be discussed in a preliminary way at that meeting in order to keep the framework of the other studies before the Council. ## Present Plans The basic tripartitely-agreed paper governing surface access procedures dated September 22, 1959, provides for two contingencies: 1. replacement of Soviet control personnel at the checkpoints Berlin-Halmatadr road and rail routes by East German personnel who capacity of agents acting for the Soviet Union, will seek to check documents of Allied personnel; and 2. replacement of Soviet control personnel at checkpoints on the Berlin-Helmstedt road and rail routes by East German personnel who, although not acting as agents of the Soviet Union, will seek to control the travel of Allied personnel. In the first case, that of explicit acknowledgment of agency relation- ship by the Soviets, the procedures to be followed will be those presently executed by Soviet control officials. In the second case, involving denial by the Soviets that such an agency relationship exists, the agreed plans to be followed involve the use of the so-called "peal-off" procedure. In essence, this is intended to identify Allied movements as being entitled to unrestricted access to Berlin, and involves handing over to East German personnel at each checkpoint a copy of the Allied travel order but not accepting the stamping of a travel order as a condition of passage. ## Physical Interference It has been proposed that instead of present plans "persistent interference" with access to Marlin should be the point at which the would have to demonstrate its determination. This proposal is made
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.