Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 163 pages · text by OCR

This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.

  • p. 92 …the above actions /designed to provide a capability for dealing with the Berlin problem in advance…
  • p. 96 …the above actions designed to provide a capability for dealing with the Berlin problem in advance…
  • p. 98 …The Berlin preparedness measures and public reaction thereto might engender hoarding, scare buying, advance stocking, speculative…
  • p. 99 …the change is due to the conjunction of high levels of economic activity in other advanced…
  • p. 100 …However, it is only prudent to plan in advance to deal with the unfavorable contingencies described…
  • p. 130 …the change is due to the conjunction of high levels of economic activity in other advanced…
  • p. 145 …The Soviets justify their demand for the conclusion of separate peace treaties with the "two German…
4. The Western Powers would state that all disputes which might arise with respect to the above-mentioned declarations would be raised and settled between the four governments. (If the Soviet Government refused to accept this the Western Powers should say that, in order to have some check on the activities of the East German authorities, the Four Powers should request the Secretary General of the United Nations to provide a representative, supported by adequate staff, to be established in both West and East Berlin, and at the access check-points, for the purpose of reporting to the Four Powers concerning any activities which appeared to be in conflict with the above-mentioned declarations).

5. The above are the only essential elements of Solution "C". Tentative language for the declarations involved has been considered by the Working Group and texts could be produced at short notice once the principles had been agreed.

6. (In connection with Solution $ ^{M}C^{N} $ , it would be possible to introduce certain elements along the lines of the Geneva proposal of July 28, e.g., undertakings regarding force limitations and abstention from $ ^{M} $ questionable activities $ ^{M} $ on a reciprocal basis. But these are not essential elements of Solution $ ^{M}C^{N} $ .)

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.