/specialCollection/BerlinWall/1961-Summer/1961-07-12c.pdf

Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.

# SECRET

# ATTACHMENT TO ANNEX I

SOLUTION "C": LONDON WORKING GROUP REPORT

1. Solution "C" was devised to cover a situation in which the Soviets were attempting to give up all their responsibilities regarding Western access to Berlin. Under their contingency plans, the Ospupying Powers are prepared to consider the possibility of a solution in which the Soviets would expressly authorize GDR personnel to function as Soviet agents in performing Soviet functions with relation to the access of the Three Powers to Berlin. Solution "C" assumes that the Soviets are not prepared explicitly to nominate the East German authorities as their agents. In effect it is an attempt to consider what would be the absolute minimum Soviet commitment with regard to access which the West would, in the last resort, be prepared to accept. Solution "C" may be summarized as follows:

2. The Western Powers would inform the Soviets and subsequently make a formal declaration to the effect that:

a) they consider that they have absolute and unqualified rights, until Berlin is once more the capital of a reunified Germany, and that these rights include the right to have their troops remain in West Berlin and to have freedom of communications maintained between West Berlin and the Federal Republic in the same general conditions as hitherto;

b) they continue to hold the Soviet Government responsible for the fulfillment of its obligations to the Three Powers in relation to their presence in Berlin and freedom of access thereto.

3. The Western Powers would then state that they would be prepared to take cognizance of a declaration of the Soviet Government guaranteeing that free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water and by air would be maintained for all persons, goods and communications, including those of Western forces stationed in Berlin, in accord with the procedures in effect in April, 1959 and would not object if the East German authorities made a parallel statement to the same effect. The Western Powers would make it clear that the access procedures could thereafter be carried out by German personnel. (As a less satisfactory alternative, the Western Powers would be prepared to accept a Soviet declaration associating the Soviet Government with an East German declaration in accordance with the terms set forth above, previously made either to the Soviet Government or "to whom it may concern".)

4. The Western