Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Cooper”8 pages
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they had been able to carry out at least some important features of their program. This contingency is probably an unrealistic one, and the most that can pridently be looked for is the kind of Soviet uncertainty the implications of which are discussed later. 14. In the assumed optimum type of situation now being considered, however, it might be possible to achieve a tacit understanding with the Soviets so that the claimed effects of their signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR would be mitigated to the extent of preserving the essentials of the Western position in Berlin without an explicit new agreement. Assuming the Soviets' commitment to a peace treaty with the GDR to be an important one for them in prestige terms, we might take the line with them privately that we cannot, of course, stop them physically from signing a peace treaty with the GDR, although we could not approve or underwrite a treaty confirming the division of Germany and would have to oppose it publicly. On the other hand, we could point out that a major practical interest to us would be the effect which such a peace treaty would have on our position in Berlin. Provided that arrangements similar to those under the Bolz-Zorin exchange of letters were still continued in effect, the signing of the peace treaty need not necessarily precipitate a crisis involving our position in Berlin. We on our part could try to make the necessary adjustments. 1/ In a letter from the Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic (Bolz) to Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (Zorin) September 20, 1955, it was stipulated that: "The control of traffic of troops and material of the garrisons of France, England, and the United States stationed in West Berlin passing between the German Federal Republic and West Berlin, will temporarily be exercised by the command of Soviet troops in Germany, pending the conclusion of an appropriate agreement. To this end, the transportation of military personnel or of garrison material of the troops of the three Western Powers in West Berlin will be permitted on the basis of existing Four-Power decisions: (A) On the Autobahn Berlin-Marienborn, (B) On the SECRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.