Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Cooper”8 pages
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## SECRET Allied preparations, and therefore be hesitant to move decisively without possibility of calling a halt but also unwilling to retreat or to accept any arrangement which could not be represented as a considerable achievement. ## III. Later Negotiations ## A. Soviet Intentions 11. A necessary starting point for any formulation of Western negotiating positions must be some assessment of Soviet intentions in the Berlin crisis. There are two competing theories as to Soviet objectives: (a) that they are using Berlin essentially as a lever to achieve a wider purpose of obtaining recognition of the GDR and consolidation of the Satellite Bloc; and (b) that West Berlin is a primary object in itself because its continuance in its present form is so harmful to the East that it must be eliminated. The truth probably lies in some combination of the two and the West must presently base its calculations on such an assessment. Berlin is indeed a useful lever with which to attempt to gain a broader objective, whether it be the holding of a summit meeting, a greater measure of recognition for the GDR, or a stabilization of the status quo in Eastern Europe. At the same time, West Berlin's role as a channel for the flow of refugees, as a center of Western propaganda and intelligence activities and as a show-window which dramatically and daily highlights the relative lack of success in the East is such that the Soviets may feel that they cannot tolerate it for the indefinite future. 12. If this analysis is correct, the Western negotiating position should presumably contain two major components: (a) some all-German features; and (b) the elements of a satisfactory Berlin arrangement. ## B. Maximum Effectiveness of Western Deterrent 13. If, through actions taken in the forthcoming months, the Western Powers can convince the Soviet Union that to proceed with their announced course will involve a grave risk of thermonuclear war, the Soviets may be amenable to some sort of face-saving formula which would allow the status quo to remain substantially unchanged while, at the same time, permitting them to claim that
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.