Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Cooper”8 pages
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
as a 'toncession'; in fact they ask us to give up our absolute rights for a doubtful leasehold with a built-in risk that this is a first step towards swallowing up West Berlin. 5. The West certainly do not desire war, nor will there be war if the basic situation is left as it is. But we are determined to take any necessary steps to safeguard our position. 6. The Soviets justify their demand for the conclusion of separate peace treaties with the "two German States" by the alleged "Militarism" and "Aggressive Plans" of the Federal Republic. This is an obvious pretext since the Soviet Union with its tremendous military potential can not and does not feel manaced by the Federal Republic whose defense forces are merely a component of the common NATO Defense System. The real aims of the Soviet demand are to perpetuate the division of Germany and to tighten its hold over Central and Eastern Europe in order to consolidate their basis for further advances into Western Europe. 7. Berlin may seem a remote European problem, but Mr. Khrushchev is playing with fire. If he persists he may bring us close to nuclear war. This will affect all the peoples of the world. It is important therefore that they realize clearly what are the issues involved and leave Mr. Khrushchev in no doubt of their feelings. 8. The Soviet position in Germany can be depicted in terms of imperialism. The West are striving for the self-determination of all Germans which the Russians have constantly frustrated. 15. Steps should be taken to increase instability in East Germany and in the Eastern European satellites and to make the Soviets aware of the dangers of such instability. It is believed that this action can be carried out more effectively overtly rather than covertly, possibly through high level public statements expressing our hope that not only the people of East Germany but those of all of Eastern Europe may ultimately again enjoy the rights of self-determination. In this connection reference should be made to repeated Soviet demands for self-determination for all colonial areas. We should respond to these demands by calling upon the Soviets to grant self-determination to their East German colony and to the disenfranchised millions in their Eastern European empire. (Action responsibility: White House, State)
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.